

WORLD OUTLOOK

OCTOBER 1969



ADVANCE SPECIAL
PROJECT



THE
MONTH

Will You Hold Me for a While?

"Will you hold me? Just for a little while? Some day someone will come and take me home."

"My mother died when I was born. Everyone at the hospital tried to save her. Now they care for me in the Babyfold."

A lot of Rhodesian babies can't be cared for by their parents. There was "Mary Twin," brought to the Babyfold in Nyadiri from a leper camp. Her twin had died, and tiny Mary (2 lb., 10 ozs. at birth) was suffering from malaria, measles and pneumonia. Her parents died at the camp and no one claimed Mary. But she's a sturdy five year old now, living in a "real" home, with a "real" mother.

Babies here will continue to need our help. Sometimes a father is ill and can't support his family. If he is dead or imprisoned (like a growing number of Africans), the mother can't cope with even one more mouth to feed. Or there may not be room with twelve others at home.

The Babyfold at Washburn Hospital was started for

babies in families like these. Most enter in the first days of their lives. Strenuous efforts are made to find them another home as quickly as possible. Although some need medical care for months, the goal is to have them in a new home in less than two years.

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THIS MONTH

In line with our policy of bringing you material to supplement the mission studies of the churches, this month we bring you a special issue on China to accompany the study, "Toward Understanding China and the Chinese People."

China is a controversial subject to many Americans. Fortunately, there are signs that the emotional nature of American reaction is getting somewhat calmer and that more examination of this vital area of the world is possible. The change in attitude of our State Department is one good example of this tendency.

A calmer atmosphere does not mean unanimity of opinion and you will not find a "party line" about China in these pages. What we think you will find are informed opinions.

Charles C. West uses his background as a China missionary and a theologian to look historically at the role of Christianity in China and to draw lessons for the churches from that history.

Also from a religious perspective, Baden Teague, an Australian who visited China in 1968, examines the often-made statement that Maoism is the new religion of Communist China and that Mao himself is treated as a god.

Among the authors of Chinese background, Dr. Hu looks sympathetically yet critically at the Communist attempt to build a new culture in China. His appraisal of the success of that attempt is contradicted in some ways by Dr. Harper, who examines the first twenty years of the rule of the People's Republic. Incidentally, October 1 is the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of this government.

Some of the cultural activities of the "new" China are shown by the pictures of the statues in the Rent Collection Courtyard ("Art Serves the Revolution") and in a famous poem by Chairman Mao himself.

Dr. Hsiung shows us how China views the outside world. Three Asians offer differing glimpses of how China looks to Asians.

Bruce Douglass raises the question whether the moment has arrived for a new look at Chinese-American relations. Dr. Chen, a native Formosan, proposes an independent status for that island as a solution to that thorny question.

The whole issue is summed up by our cover photograph—the average Chinese with his bowl of rice. Whoever fills that bowl and satisfies that man will have answered many of the arguments about China.

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P. 23, *Evening Standard*, London, from *Atlas*
Pp. 26-27, *Rent Collection Courtyard*, Foreign
Languages Press, Peking
P. 35, *The Los Angeles Times* Syndicate

COVER

Chinese Man with a Bowl of Rice
Paris Match, from Pictorial Parade

LETTERS

BEWARE OF UNCLE IVAN

"We May Not Want One, But It Is Needed."

The title above is my answer to the question posed by the title of your August editorial, "Who Wants A Nuclear Umbrella?" Unless we are willing to sacrifice our freedom, and our right to consider God the highest, we must maintain some sort of shield against the militant Communist world.

Pacifism may be Christian, but it sure isn't worth a damn if the other side is militant. Even though we in the Western end of the Free World like to deceive ourselves by saying that the Russkies want peaceful coexistence, it is all too unfortunate when we wake up to be greeted by the news of the Russkies giving the Czechs and Slovaks the "Proper Marxist-Leninist" line. Also, just about all of the strategic material which is used to kill Americans and our Korean, Thai, Filipino, Aussie, and New Zealander allies—to say nothing of Vietnamese—in Vietnam is supplied to the Communists by "Peace-loving" Uncle Ivan. Also, we are greeted by a very militant Chinese Communist government which, incidentally, is trying to take the leadership of the world Communist movement away from Russia.

Hence, in the face of such events, it is necessary for somebody to lead the non-Communist world in defense of freedom. Whether we Americans like it or not, we are the only ones capable of doing the job. Britannia no longer rules the waves, the Kuomintang is bottled up on a few little islands instead of running all of China, France is no longer a force to be reckoned with, and Germany is divided. Also, the Japanese are willing to let Uncle Sam do the job of defending their islands in case old Alex in the Kremlin decides to reach for another piece of land (The Russians are within easy distance of the Japanese islands). So that leaves old Uncle Sam to do the dirty work. Also, as the Russians have the bomb, it would be unwise for America to give up its tedious nuclear supremacy while the Russians are not only powerful in terms of nuclear might, but also have a strong army and navy.

Now suppose that the Protestant states of sixteenth century Europe decided to remain divided in the face of a Catholic church determined to bring them back into the fold. We would all be saying our *Ave Marias*, *Paters*, *Filiuses*, and *Esperitu Sanctums*, etc., and clicking our beads. If the Christian world decided to stay all divided and passive in the late seventeenth century while the Turks were banging on the gates of Vienna, we would all be facing Mecca while listening to somebody in a tower reciting "God is greatest! There is no God but God! Mohammed is the apostle of God! Come to salvation! . . ."

So if we put down our nuclear umbrella, we will all be chanting "'Tis the final conflict, let Each stand in his place. For the Revolutionary Proletariat will save the human race!"

I hope that you Ecumenicists don't want that kind of world religion.

P. HENZ
Bethesda, Maryland

A FAIRER REPRESENTATION

It would appear that Dr. Garrett in his letter in the August issue has missed the meaning and message of Christianity, the purpose of missions, and the function of WORLD OUTLOOK. Apparently he missed just about everything. The tone of his letter reminds one that the Kerner report says that white racism is the main cause of riots and unrest.

Although the good doctor is aware that

Negroes make up 11 percent of the U.S. population, he probably doesn't know the ratio of average income, white to black, nor other related statistics, nor historical background. Nor ghetto conditions, and their effect on personality. Nor the responsibility of the Christian church, if Negroes' personalities are as he describes them. If he knew all these things, he would not need to question the cause of the unrest and dissatisfaction. Who wouldn't be dissatisfied?

He seems to expect the main emphasis in WORLD OUTLOOK to be according to financial ratios. Those who pay the bills should be the ones who get their pictures in the papers. Could it be that the good doctor feels neglected? (I doubt he'd qualify!)

In truth, since the magazine is the *World Outlook*, instead of 50 percent of its contents being about blacks, 75 percent would be a fairer representation. That is about the proportion of non-white people in the world—black and various shades of brown.

I am glad that WORLD OUTLOOK uses its space to keep readers informed of conditions that shout for attention and to incite some people to devise means of correcting them.

IVA CONNER
Sand Springs, Oklahoma

THAT MOTIVE EDITORIAL AGAIN

Finding a proper motive of your editorial on that subject (July) is not easy but it evidently was not building the church.

You imply a great rift between middle-aged, middle-class, and institutionally minded people on the one hand and the young on the other. And you classify the young with the disaffected. You may follow the noisy disaffected youth if you wish, but there is a great body of youth that will not follow you.

You also follow your oft-repeated stance of deriding the institution, the bishops, the establishment. There are two ways of getting rid of the establishment; one is by destroying it, the other is by gradually replacing it. You seem to prefer the former, which gives us nothing but frustration and that is what that type of thinking has given the so-called disaffected.

When you talk about the quality and nature of life or a contest between gentility and truth you lose this "old fogey." My study has taught me that man advanced from one-room shacks, tents, or caves, to divide his homes into kitchens, living rooms, bedrooms, and more and more relegated the toilet and its excrement to secluded quarters.

With this, men became even more careful about their language, especially when ladies were present, and General Grant even insisted that they be careful when gentlemen were present. An ancient letter written by a man for whom many of us "of the establishment" have a very high respect suggested that our thoughts should be on the higher and more lovely things in life. His name was Paul.

In this modern age we have a new fraternity of excrementalists, who are so addicted to words not in the speaking vocabulary of many of the populace that they cannot express themselves except in terms of excrement. We presume that they will soon abolish the partitions between rest rooms, and offices or dining rooms, as a part of this movement, since they feel that to divide life into permissible categories, into clean and dirty, is to lie about the quality and nature of life itself.

To say that the students of today cannot express their feeling about the establishment except in terms of such insulting vulgarity is an insult to the great body of students.

It is unfortunate that so many of our leaders seek to win the favor of some leaders among

youth by taking up the whims of the moment, instead of seeking at all times to lift life a little higher. The majority of youth will applaud those who seek to uphold some established values of the past rather than accommodate to any vulgarity going.

Praise God for men like Dr. Wicke.

Excrementalists have no place in the leadership of the Christian church. Nor indeed do those who uphold them in their vulgarity.

REV. CHARLES A. SAUER
(Missionary, retired)
Ashley, Ohio

A LITTLE ASSURANCE

Thank you for the editorial in the July, 1969, issue of WORLD OUTLOOK entitled "Finding the Proper Motive." Such statements in a church magazine are clues to me—amid vast evidence to the contrary—that there are people in the church who are out in front of the civilizing process and that not all church people are being dragged along hopelessly behind. You give me a little assurance that I belong in the church.

MRS. LYNN LARSON (Missionary)
El Biar, Algeria

METHODISM IN HONG KONG

In Hong Kong there are nine Methodist churches and one chapel with a total membership of 2300. The church has involved itself in a variety of types of church work: villages, education, rooftop centers, social services. Both Asbury Village and Wesley Village have been set up as small communities to serve families in need of low-cost housing. Each village has within it a church, kindergarten, and community center. There are four primary schools: North Point (where I teach), Asbury, Wong Tai Sin, and Li Cheng Uk (the last two are rooftop schools). Six of the churches have weekday kindergartens which meet in their church buildings. There are three rooftop kindergartens; also three recreation centers have been established on rooftops.

The Plummer Fund Diagnostic Laboratory provides medical services. Yang Social Service Centre has a varied program with its social workers, dentist, day nursery, and home nursing program. The Methodist Silvermine Bay Conference Centre provides several cottages, dormitories, dining hall, meeting hall, and chapel for many groups for retreats and camps. The Wesley Village Production Company handles the selling of handwork done by many of the Wesley Village residents. At Asbury Village there is a clinic serving those in need of medical care. There is a mobile dental clinic serving eight towns in the New Territories. Recently Tai Po Village has been constructed for resettlement of fisher folk from sampans (small house-fishing boats). One church has a Tea House which meets nightly.

Some of the interdenominational concerns which the Methodist Church supports with finances and in some cases with workers are: Chung Chi College, the Industrial Committee, Audio-Visual Evangelism, Council on Chinese Christian Literature, United Christian Hospital Program and Hong Kong Christian Service.

Some of the quadrennial goals of the Methodist Church here are: church union with the British-related Methodist Church; self-support; better leadership training; use of lay ministry in church extension; new forms of ministry in urban-industrial life; establishing a secondary school; experimenting in new and meaningful patterns of worship.

JUDY BUTLER
Missionary to Hong Kong

BOOKS

CHINA: YELLOW PERIL? RED HOPE?
by C. R. Hensman. Philadelphia, 1969:
The Westminster Press, paper, 241 pages,
\$2.65.

C. R. Hensman provides the nearest thing to a dialogue on the question posed in the title of his book. His opening chapters are fair presentations, full of insight, on the two opposing views of China's position and stake in the world. He first outlines the image of China projected by recognized Western political leaders and analysts, limiting his references to levelheaded liberals. Omitting reference to any McCarthy-types, Hensman establishes beyond doubt the West's "portrait of a totalitarian monster." Then switching to the Chinese perspective, he catalogues the tawdry record of Western domination and humiliation of China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the inevitable xenophobic mentality of a nation whose borders are threatened on all sides by alien military bases. Hensman avers that a redefinition of the problem of China is in order, as exemplified by a cartoon which appeared in the *Peking Review* alongside an article by William Bundy charging China with "aggression" and "expansion." The cartoon pictures "a huge United States soldier holding up two bombs and rushing over Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and South Vietnam shouting, 'The Chinese are coming!'"

The West is infuriated by China's blatant independence, her successful economic, political and cultural revolutions. "China's crime is, of course, that it was reunified and revived by Communists" according to a *Guardian* editorial.

For Christians, Hensman's final chapter on "Questions from China" is a sobering challenge. "Maoist China comes closer to exemplifying Christian virtues than contemporary America. . . . Are those, who see in the condemned and outcast Jesus Christ the model and inspiration of the 'new man,' going to combat and speak ill of the ideal of the new man in the new China?" Hensman asks whether Christians will recognize China's accomplishments or whether they too will resent with others the fact that the Chinese people have "stood up"? He quotes Chou En-lai's responses to a British writer: "We aren't trying to destroy individuality. But we are certainly doing our best to destroy individualism. It's a policy of 'No man for himself and every man for others.'"

Hensman's book, written from a sympathetic, yet scholarly perspective, strikes a hard and stinging blow at Euramerica's "misrepresentations" of China. As Hensman points out: "Trick photography can give us much fun. If trick history were written only to give us fun, it would be harmless. But facts about the actions and sufferings of other peoples are in fact a means of our establishing a relationship with them as people."

One would hope that Hensman's book will be widely circulated among Americans who

have been too long isolated from modern China.

Donald J. Wilson

Dr. Wilson, formerly a missionary to Taiwan, is on the staff of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.

CHINA IN CHANGE: AN APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING, edited by M. Searle Bates. New York, 1969: Friendship Press, paper, 191 pages, \$1.50.

Professor Bates, the distinguished China historian from the University of Nanking and Union Theological Seminary in New York, has brought together in the compact adult study book for the churches' "Understanding China" study theme (1969-70) papers by six China specialists dealing with modern China. Each of these can stand alone, covering its subject thoroughly in brief compass. Together they provide an excellent introduction for a study of modern China.

Four professors trace the modern history of China, social change, and China's relations with the world. Two chapters, written by missionaries with long China experience, summarize the history of Christianity in China and United States/Canada relations with China.

The book is an admirable contribution to the efforts to understand China so eloquently urged by Dr. Bates in his conclusion: "First and last, we North Americans need to inform ourselves, sympathetically and factually, about the Chinese as persons. . . . The effort, in the face of isolation, hostility and risk, to avoid extensive war is tremendously urgent. But the beginning and the end are in human attitudes—the slow, manifold overcoming of isolation and hostility, the rich rewards to be found in a humanity of common benefit. . . . Hostile isolation beholds no future. China, the Chinese people, the issues they raise for us and the world, require far more of mind and heart than we have given."

Donald MacInnis

Dr. MacInnis is director of the China Program of the National Council of Churches and editor of CHINA NOTES, a quarterly published by the NCC.

CHINA PROFILE, edited by Ross Terrill. New York, 1969: Friendship Press, paper, 160 pages, \$1.75.

The six writers for this book addressed to older youth are, appropriately, all non-Americans—since Americans are not free to visit China these days. All have firsthand experience in China, three of them (two Australians and a Canadian) having taught English in Shanghai for two years, 1965-67.

Addressing his American youth readers, the editor says of his writers: "The authors start from the belief that young people today are ready to give China a fair chance. In a world full of propaganda—some of it not recognized as such—you who belong to the new generation must sternly refuse to accept the old myths."

Ross Terrill recognizes that his writers have queries, doubts and anxieties about aspects of China today. "But they do not want China to fail in her socialist experiment," he says. "They hope she will succeed

for the sake of the people of China."

In his final paragraph, closing the book, Terrill writes of China's challenge to the rest of the world. "Many speak of China simply as a problem. But China today also presents a kind of solution to two pressing problems of the emerging, exploited areas of the world: how to pull a society out of feudal stagnation and poverty and how to achieve the spiritual dignity of national independence in the fullest sense after the humiliations of colonialism."

With these as shared perceptions of the Chinese revolution, the chapter authors, often drawing on firsthand experience, present competent surveys of China's culture; origins and development of the Communist revolution; descriptions of life in China under Communism; and reflections on foreign policy implications, especially for Americans.

CHINA PROFILE is a competent introduction to mainland China today, written in sprightly style with personal anecdote and observation. It may be the best book now available in English to introduce the subject to young Americans.

Donald MacInnis

THIS IS CHINA TODAY: A FRESH LOOK, by Norman A. Endicott. New York, 1969: Friendship Press, paper, 32 pages, 95 cents.

This brief book, well illustrated with contemporary photographs from China, is a fragmentary kind of traveler's diary. The author, a Canadian born in China, revisited the country of his birth in October 1966. Told largely through the words of Chinese whom he interviewed, the book does not fulfill the promise of the title. This is not *China*; it is rather a sequence of controlled glimpses into certain Chinese cities, factories, workers' apartments, farm communes, kindergartens and Red Guard units. A brief chapter titled "We Have Stood Up" departs from the firsthand observer format, superficially tracing China's "century of humiliation" leading up to the Communist victory.

These are "controlled glimpses," because (as the author fails to point out) any outsider's view of China today is limited to those places and persons he is permitted to see. We have, then, statistics of phenomenal production gains at a model commune given as undisputed fact, with no mention of the statistical misrepresentations that invalidate, for example, the fantastic gains in farm output falsely reported for the Great Leap Forward (1958).

The limitations of the isolated interview format are obvious in other examples from this book. China is justly proud of great progress in industrial technology, as described in a Shanghai factory. But no single factory, commune, worker or Red Guard can speak for all of China. This book fails to present—or even suggest—a full, balanced picture of "China today."

While one youth viewpoint is represented by an 18-year-old member of the first Red Guard group, there is no clear statement of the fundamental ideological conflicts that have shattered the unity of the nation during the three years of the Cultural Revolution.

The basic issues in this national crisis are only partially suggested. There is no mention of the systematic attack on the Communist Party leadership, nor the fact that two-thirds of the Central Committee have been removed in the internal struggles of the past three years.

In short, while many of the insights of this book are valid and important for Americans, the lack of objectivity, balance and critical evaluation make this a dubious primer on modern China.

Donald MacInnis

WORSHIP RESOURCES FROM THE CHINESE, edited by Bliss Wiant. New York, 1969: Friendship Press, paper, 72 pages, \$1.25.

Dr. Wiant is a leading American authority on Chinese Christian hymns and religious music. Until the Communist takeover of China, he was for twenty-eight years professor of music at Yenching University, Peking. Here he was organizer and director of the famous Yenching University Chorus which gave the first student presentation in the Orient of Handel's "Messiah."

In this little volume he gives English-translated materials from the Chinese for use in our churches and with church groups. There are 32 hymns (with suggested tunes familiar in American hymnals) for use in worship services, together with five litanies and five brief discourses from the Chinese. These and the hymns are grouped on the life of Christ, on adoration, on home and community, on times and seasons, on Christian faith and outreach in a non-Christian culture.

This is excellent new material for those seeking to prepare services of worship.

W. W. Reid

AN ARCHEOLOGIST LOOKS AT THE GOSPEL, by James L. Kelso. Waco, Texas, 1968: Word Books, 142 pages, \$3.95.

Dr. Kelso is retired professor of Old Testament history and biblical archeology at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary. Between 1926 and 1964 he made ten archeological expeditions to Palestine, working among Bedouin farmers and urban dwellers, majoring in the geography of the land and the customs and manners of the people there. He has directed archeological excavations in other areas of the Holy Land, and was for some years director of the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem; later in Bethel, in Jericho, and in Jordan.

With this background of almost half a century, Dr. Kelso re-studies the gospel account of Jesus' life, training, teaching, travels from his birth in Bethlehem to his death on Calvary, and his resurrection. The volume is a remarkable tracing of Jesus' life as a child, as a carpenter, and as an itinerant teacher and preacher. It has many comments and suggestions not usually found in New Testament commentaries. The whole country—as well as its greatest Person—becomes alive in this volume.

As Dr. Kelso himself comments: "Whenever a professional archeologist turns to a

careful, detailed study of the gospels, only one thing dominates all his thinking. This is Jesus Christ himself. The personality of Christ is unique and alone in all human history. The archeologist realizes more than anyone else the difference between B. C. and A. D."

This volume can be recommended as a highly interesting, readable, and informative account, shedding new light and understanding to any study of the life of Jesus, and the environment into which he was born and in which he served.

W.W.R.

HIM WE DECLARE, by Cuthbert Bardsley and William Purcell. Waco, Texas, 1968: Word Books, 45 pages, \$3.95.

The authors of this volume are, respectively, the Anglican Bishop of Coventry, England, and the Canon of Worcester Cathedral, England. They are two of the leading churchmen of their nation, and well known as writers and broadcasters.

Their volume is a reconsideration of some of the basic tenets, beliefs, and goals of the Christian faith. The consideration, the authors say, is directed chiefly to two kinds of people: those within the church having "an ingrained reverence for its ways and teaching nonetheless real, if not productive of any very startling spiritual experiences," to whom any public affirmation of faith is difficult; and those people "who find serious difficulties, intellectual and other, in accepting what the church has to say to them now, or disappointment in the fact that what it has to say seems so little, and its manner of doing it so unattractive."

"But," the authors add, "the need for a God who may be personally encountered, whom we know and who we can feel knows us, does not grow less. On the contrary, it grows more acute as our world grows increasingly impersonal." The question then considered is whether or not it is possible for men personally to know the Christ whom God sent into the world and to know God through Christ. The question is answered in the affirmative in the evidence of Christ in the lives of men and women—even in the lives of those with doubts and questions.

The volume is a help and guide to those who are troubled and cannot accept some of the "negative teaching" that seems widespread in some religious circles today. Yet it is far more than an unreasoned re-affirmation of yesterday's beliefs.

W.W.R.

RECONCILIATION—THE FUNCTION OF THE CHURCH, by Eugene C. Bianchi. New York, 1969: Sheed and Ward, 211 pages, \$5.50.

The author of this volume attempts to point the church towards a conception of itself as a "series of communities of reconciliation amid the alienations that vex humanity today." He notes that these "alienations" to which the church must give attention—and he finds that attempts are being made in many places to counter them—include psychological alienation from nature, self, and neighbor; alienation between people through economic and social

injustices; alienation through prejudices of race, class, and nation; alienation from the sources of political and social decision-making, from hunger, from poverty, from war, etc. "Such alienations" he asserts, "with their perils for the future of man must become the chief concerns for a church that would realize its redemptive task in the twentieth century."

He adds: "A thoroughly secularized world has produced a new series of human alienations, along with its superlative technical and cultural accomplishments. Some crucial questions face the church, estranged in many ways from contemporary man. Can the church succeed in bringing its life style and structures up-to-date for the sake of a 'disalienated' human community in urban society? Can the church restate her teachings so that they make sense in a secular society? Can the church reshape its liturgy to speak with power amid the life rhythms of the twentieth century? Before any of these questions can be adequately answered, the church must rediscover itself as a community of reconciling shalom amid human alienations."

It is Dr. Bianchi's contention that in recent centuries the major Christian churches have developed, taught, and lived a "theology of rift," and that the age of technology has contributed largely to this separation of the church from the reality of the needs of men and of the world. He makes a case for the replacement of this "rift" by a "theology of reconciliation" in which the churches will see themselves—and will be—"communities of shalom"—that is, of New Testament peace, the peace that reaches out to all men and not just for the individual Christian or church group.

"This shalom, however, is not given primarily for the inner comfort of the Christian churches," he says. "They are called to be missionary communities, laboring through their preaching and witness to open new gatherings of men to God's shalom through Christ. His mission, bluntly stated, is not primarily to establish an institutional church, but to initiate the universal reconciliation of all men into a final community of shalom. Certainly the churches are vessels of election in this task, but they are the privileged means to a wider peace. We do not deny that the inner life of the church communities, the life of Word, sacramental agape and witness, can in a true sense also be considered as an end in itself. But ultimately these ecclesial communities exist for the more comprehensive task of universal shalom."

Part I of *Reconciliation—the Function of the Church* is entitled "A Church of Separation or Shalom?"—with suggestions of how and where to recover biblical shalom. Part II is a study of secularization—its values and its alienations. Part III is entitled "The Worldly Church in Mission."

Dr. Bianchi is assistant professor of religion at Emory University, and a director of the National Committee on Catholic Concerns. He was earlier assistant editor of the Catholic magazine, *America*.

W. W. R.

EDITORIALS

The UN's Twenty-Fourth

"Let us take a look at ourselves first," said the newly-elected President of the United Nations' twenty-fourth General Assembly, Miss Angie E. Brooks of Liberia. Quietly, she noted that last year's assembly had shown "the opposite of dynamism," had ignored certain major world problems, and had contributed to "the gradual decline of the United Nations in the eyes of public opinion."

Such straightforward realism is unusual in the world of diplomacy and especially in the United Nations, which has long had its own credibility gap. Delegates, said Miss Brooks, should not "yield to the delusion that we are doing our best and that the world persists in misjudging us."

At least four areas of concern now demand that the United Nations do its best.

The "decline of the United Nations" can be arrested this month if there is positive movement in the direction of disarmament talks. There is reported to be, at this writing, "considerable optimism" among the delegates about some sort of arms-limitation agreement among the big powers and under UN auspices. It was precisely for such purposes that the United Nations was called into being as "the last great hope for mankind" and for peace.

With a president from the oldest republic in Africa, the General Assembly should turn its attention to the deteriorating situation in Namibia (South West Africa), a country which might be the continent's newest republic if the UN properly exercised its responsibilities. Last April, South Africa passed the South West Africa Affairs Bill and took over Namibia, making it a fifth province of that apartheid government. Continued UN inaction can only enforce the impression in Namibia that they have been betrayed by the world body. And that will be no "misjudgment."

Another concern of this session is the escalating conflict in the Middle East. One major source of the UN's decline in the eyes of public opinion is the cavalier treatment accorded its Security Council resolutions by the belligerents, especially by Israel but

also by the Arabs. While some of these resolutions—such as the recent one on the Al Aksa fire—have been less than fair to Israel, others which have emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the rights of refugees are hardly "one-sided." Nor does Israel, itself a child of the UN, aid the cause of peace by considering Jerusalem "outside the legal competence of the General Assembly" when that city is clearly the sorest point in the conflict.

Finally, for years the United States has led the opposition to admission of Red China to the UN, while the People's Republic of China has responded apparently with the attitude: "Who wants it, anyway?" Now comes word from Canadian Foreign Minister Mitchell W. Sharp and Secretary General U Thant that Communist China may want to join after all, and without its former "conditions." Such a shift, if true, coupled with the Nixon Administration's avowed purpose to seek a new China policy, will lead hopefully to admission of that enigmatic and ostracized power to the community of nations. Regardless of Communist China's intentions, the exclusion of more than 700 million people from representation in the United Nations makes that body a world body in name only.

How Not to End a War

President Nixon's style in seeking to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War is becoming clearer. It is to couple verbal claims that we are doing all we can to ensure peace with the grudging making of minimal concessions.

Leaving aside the mystery of the on again-off again bombing pause following the death of Ho Chih Minh (and what a missed opportunity for psychological fence-mending that was), the latest announcement on troop withdrawals illustrates this tactic. One can hardly quarrel with Mr. Nixon's rhetoric. "The time has come to end this war," he said. The problem is that if U.S. troops continue to be withdrawn at the present rate, it would be another eight or nine years before they all left Vietnam.

It is not necessary to argue for a unilateral, immediate pullout of American troops to suggest that the present

rate is inadequate. Reportedly, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird himself advised the president that the number of withdrawals were not enough to impress either the Vietnamese or anti-war protestors in the United States.

Sentiment in the United States does in fact appear to be Mr. Nixon's chief concern. He has so far succeeded in giving just enough to blunt the edge of protest without opening himself to the charges from the right of having given in to the North Vietnamese.

This is shrewd politics in the short run but over the long haul it may be shrewd rather than wise. Such an approach can only serve to delay any settlement and to prolong the present stalemate. In addition, it hands over a certain amount of the initiative to the Thieu-Ky regime in Saigon, who have already used that initiative to upset moves toward a cease-fire or peace overtures.

Finally, the peace groups in the United States are beginning to regroup their forces. This month will see how well their current strategy is working. If the war is not settled soon, it may avail itself of a pent-up fury stronger than any yet seen.

In short, President Nixon has succeeded in buying the administration time but has as yet shown no signs that he has the political courage to bite the bullet and end the war. End the war, that is, on the kind of terms on which it must be ended.

Any settlement which envisages ending up with a slightly expended version of the present Saigon regime in control of Vietnam (and the Viet Cong returned to the status of happy peasants) is unrealistic, to say the least. That was the vision that deluded Lyndon Johnson and Dean Rusk for so long. It is a delusion that is a more potent narcotic in Washington than any psychedelic drug has produced. And it is ultimately a "bad trip."

James A. Pike

The death of Bishop James A. Pike in the Judean desert brings to a tragic close the life of a man who could never rest easy in the accepted formulations of religion, yet was always pressing to seek what was behind those partial descriptions of the divine. May he rest in peace where that mystery becomes clear to us all.



CHRISTIANITY AND CHINA

AN INTERVIEW
WITH
CHARLES C. WEST

A missionary in China after World War II, Dr. West is now Professor of Christian Ethics at Princeton Theological Seminary. He is the author of *Communism and the Theologians* and *Outside the Camp*.

What was the influence of Christianity on China?

It's very difficult to separate Christianity from the whole Western influence. The gunboats in the Yangtze River after the Opium War forced the Chinese to realize they were no longer powerful and they had to think of power in quite new terms. The industries and commercial influence of the West forced





China to realize it was not self-sufficient economically. Western philosophies and ideas permeated China as suggested ways China could reorganize itself politically. You had all of this pouring in on China.

The special influence of Christian missions were two: a concept of man as a person rather than as a member of a family and, as a result of this, the effort to establish humanitarian institutions. One of the first impacts of Christianity was a humanitarian outrage at cruel conditions and an effort to do something about them, raising up the picture of man as he is in Christ. The attack on foot-binding is the obvious external example, but schools for women and the concept of a woman as a person in her own right, which she wasn't in the old

Chinese family, are more significant. All of the external evidences of the Christian influence are now swept away in the Communist Revolution or given a Communist form. How that will work in the future is an open question.

The Christian Gospel itself was revolutionary on ancient concepts of society, on values and the rest—first of all in the concept of what man could be in relation to Christ, and secondly, in its concept of history moving toward a goal which realizes a new promise for man. From this dynamic comes a sense of stewardship of the forces of nature, the demythologizing of nature so that you

Laying the cornerstone of Payne Hall, Hwau-nan College, 1912. Bishop Bashford officiating; Dr. J. H. Worley translating.



The first ordained Chinese ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Foochow, 1869.



Church members erecting their own new church building, Lungtien District, 1948.

no longer saw nature as some eternal structure which surrounds and limits man and has to be propitiated by sacrifices but rather as something to be reorganized in the interests of human development.

Now this is, in a way, the social tragedy. Having awakened these ideals, this expectation, in young people who

came to Christian mission schools, the missions had no guidance to give them. How can you take this message and transform society? The missions had no answer. The tendency among the more fundamentalistic was to reduce the whole thing to an experience in the church. But even those who didn't want to reduce the Christian message to some-

thing very individualistic and very tame in the way of contribution of church life to society were very timid in following through the challenge this offered to the old structures of society—where it was not an immediate humanitarian concern. So these students sought the realization of the ideals they'd found somewhere else.

How were missionaries handicapped in working with the Chinese?

There was the problem of isolation—partly due to standards of living and partly to the language. A third isolation was due to the success of the 1927 Revolution. When the Kuomintang came north, the missionaries either left China or came to grips with the question, What is the Revolution? and became supporters of the Kuomintang. So you had a good class of missionaries who just threw themselves into the building of China between 1929 and 1936 in alliance with the Kuomintang and who felt this was the future of China, you see. Now the tragedy was that, having given themselves to this, they were incapable of seeing how this was breaking down and they came back to China after the war expecting the Kuomintang to be the same creative force and were therefore virulently anti-Communist. Those people were out of place in the postwar period, precisely because of their identification with the prewar Chinese Renaissance. So there was isolation from the revolutionary movements that had gone beyond them.

What strength and staying power was evident in Protestantism before the Revolution?

All the Protestant churches and sects together had less than one million adherents (the Roman Catholic Church had over three million). But Protestantism had the strength of being far more widespread and influential. It was also much weaker organizationally than Catholicism. This was evident after the Revolution: Protestant churches were easier to take over by using left-wing Christians in their midst, those who would do what the government wanted. But in the long run it may still be true

that the widespread nature of Protestant Christianity will make it possible to re-establish itself provided it can get beyond denominationalism.

There's one other little wrinkle: I noticed Pentecostal Christianity springing up the year I was there under the Communists. Now the thing about Pentecostal Christianity is you can meet in a quiet corner somewhere and have your prayer meeting and experience the Spirit without raising doctrinal questions, without even having a Bible. It can spring up on the spur of the moment and nobody can ask about its organization and no government official can put his finger on who is responsible for it. Pentecostalism is, one might say, the last resort of a Christian people that has no other way of organizing and expressing itself. But it may also be the seedbed out of which a new Christianity with more substance might come back.

So there are really three Christian communities, probably sub rosa, in China: a Catholic, a mainline Protestant and a Pentecostal. I think they exist, yes. I believe that Christians will find themselves together and find ways of praying and strengthening each other under any circumstances.

What lessons are there to be learned from China?

The Chinese Revolution happened and we were expelled from China as foreign missions a good many years ago. I think it was the first clear example of the depth of our own involvement in subtle forms of domination we hadn't realized before. One of the main things we learned out of the China experience was the way we as foreigners were controlling when we thought we weren't, in spite of the fact that there were Chinese principals in every Chinese school and

Chinese leaders in every Chinese church and even Chinese treasurers in every Chinese presbytery. Still, the money came from abroad and this had a subtle influence on decision making and a subtle kind of dependence took place.

One of the big things Christian missions ought to have learned from the Chinese situation is to work much harder and much more carefully on the problem of being subject to their brethren in the Lord, learning how really to give freedom to the churches in the countries where these churches are new and where they were founded by missions, so that they could learn something of the character of the Christ relation to that culture from those people.


The well-nigh universal assumption in the early twentieth century was that the Asian, African worlds were moving into modern society and that eventually they would all grow into the kinds of world we had in the West. Now we've learned that this is more complicated and the West itself is a problem, that there are internal missionary problems for us, that we are much more pagan than we made ourselves out to be. That is the second lesson: that every country is a missionary country and if we have an ecumenical mission, if we carry out our mission on a world-wide scope and we still send people abroad to participate in the mission of the church, we should be receiving people from abroad who give a special perspective on the mission of the church in this country and show us where our pagan points are.

The third point would be about the problem of revolution and a nation finding itself in the new world. A lot of people would argue with me on this point, but it seems to me that what we learned from China was the radical nature of the remaking, the restructuring of a whole civilization which comes from the impact of a dynamic history on it.



Trustees of the Sungkhang Orphanage.

A Protestant Church in Shanghai after the Communist takeover. The characters on the steeple say, "Fight for World Peace." Not identified, the church is believed to be the Moore Memorial Methodist Church.



The Chinese were unable to reconstitute their nation as a modern power in terms of their ancient culture. It couldn't be done. However, they also couldn't reconstitute it as a kind of appendage to Western culture. That would never do. Now what they have actually done is to appropriate a philosophy of a universal revolution and to make it the instrument of Chinese nationalism, of Chinese self-consciousness. The dynamic which was set in motion by that is not finished.

In a sense I think you could say that because Christian missions were not imaginative enough to offer to China a structure by which she could reconstruct herself and face the future realistically, because we weren't culturally creative enough in showing ways by which the ancient Chinese culture could be remade in this new model and still be Chinese, and because we weren't socially imaginative enough in showing ways in which great masses of people could find some way to a society where they would have a chance to be really human, Communism was the form in which the Christian-influenced tradition took over.

But the Christian-influenced tradition is a bearer of a historical dynamic which comes from Christ and from that Hebrew-Christian tradition, because only the God we meet there is really a God of history in the sense of looking toward the future and the transformation of all reality. So the same God who made China Communist I say is preparing another future one of these days. And I think that's perhaps our most important lesson: to be aware how this future is breaking in on countries like China and others coming into the modern world

and to be sensitive to this and bear witness to it.

Do we confuse Christianity and Americanism in viewing China?

That's a loaded question, isn't it? We've had a China lobby. Many former missionaries have contributed to this China lobby, and they've brought a certain amount of Christian thinking to it. The China lobby says, in effect, that the government on Taiwan is the only legitimate government of China, that it perpetrates what I think is the falsehood that China would not have been lost to Communism if Americans had given sufficient help, and it tends to play up for Christians the idea that Chiang Kai-shek and his wife are Christians and that Christians have a certain influence in that government, and that therefore there is not only legitimacy but also opportunity for Christian mission only being possible there.

This point of view has had certain popular currency; I think it's fading rapidly these days. The China lobby has been unable to prevent even a Republican administration from talking about bettering relations with Peking China. It's also a misunderstanding, as far as Christianity is concerned, of what actually happens on the island of Taiwan. The Kuomintang government is anything but favorable to Christian missions of the mainline churches. There certainly are strongly anti-Christian forces in the Kuomintang, who want to minimize the influence of the Christian church as a whole. You cannot say that the Kuomintang government is pro-Christian. Of course you do have to say that the government on the mainland is anti-Chris-

tian, but the point is that that element is really irrelevant to the whole discussion.

What might be a Christian response to China?

First of all, to try to cultivate every possible relation with it on all levels—trade relations, political and diplomatic relations, but also personal relations and the like. To try to get some sort of give and take, some sort of dialogue, going. Now I know that's difficult because the Chinese themselves in many cases are more closed to it than ever, but unless that process starts, you don't begin to get the leaven. It's not our job to go looking for these clandestine Christian groups by all means—that would only endanger them—but as and if we can get China more engaged with the world, it will become to the interest of the Chinese government not to persecute these churches so much anymore. And this would be true not only of churches but of some of the more creative forces in Chinese life as a whole.

I don't think China poses a military danger to countries round about it, because I don't think it's strong enough internally. I think its belligerent ideology has been matched by a remarkable conservatism in action, which you need to bear in mind. And the way to get China out of its neurosis period would be more responsible engagement. Now that's just practical common sense. It's also based upon a faith that there is a reconciler at work in this world among human beings even when the political evidence doesn't show that this is the case. We can count on this power and work with it.





BUILDING A NEW CONSCIOUSNESS

by hu chang-tu

Dr. Hu is co-author of China: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. A graduate of Fu-Tan University in China, he is professor of comparative education at Teachers College, Columbia University.

For a thousand years the Chinese had reason to believe they were on top of the world. That's why they referred to themselves as the Middle Kingdom. All others were merely barbarians who could be civilized by being exposed to Chinese culture, particularly Confucian teaching.

Unfortunately for the Chinese, at the time when contacts with the West began to be substantial in the latter part of the nineteenth century, China was on the verge of collapse as an imperial system of government. What Americans—primarily missionaries, government workers and traders—had to report back to the U.S. was very, very dismal because of conditions prevailing in China: population pressure, economic dislocation, defeat in wars.

Power determines the attitudes or relationship of both parties when they come into contact. Any nation or people without power to defend themselves are always looked down upon as inferior, because the success of any system is manifested in the degree of power that system enjoys. The Chinese simply had no power to speak of; they were absolutely helpless in the face of the Western, industrialized and superior powers. So the educated segment of the American population formed its unflattering impression of China and the Chinese.

At the grass-roots level, American

Attempts to forge a new culture are thoroughgoing. They include the construction of new cities (opposite, upper right), as in Silinhot, Inner Mongolia; the healthy body (upper left); the use of traditional culture, as in these singers pantomiming peasant girls (right, center); and the indoctrination of children, as these youngsters (bottom) acting out a song on a commune near Nanking. That the old culture may still persist is indicated by these men playing cards (above) while waiting for the start of a May Day parade in Peking.

prejudice against the Chinese can be traced to contact with the peasants brought in as laborers for railroad construction and the development of the West. Later, many of them settled down and ran into all kinds of trouble with the Americans. There was a period round the turn of the century when California passed law after law to restrict Chinese residents in the U.S. Many Chinese were thrown out, and there was public agitation against the Chinese, culminating in discriminatory immigration laws.

This resentment of the Chinese stemmed from cultural reasons. Here was a group of people—the least-educated and least-cultured Chinese—who didn't speak the English language, who dressed outlandishly, who were clannish, and who had many cultural traits that were distasteful to the Americans. So they were despised.

But more importantly, there was the economic reason, because the continued presence of the Chinese would tend to depress the labor market. And there were plenty of people who wanted to take advantage of this public fear and arouse their suspicion.

These two images of the Chinese—formed from private correspondence and publications of Americans in China and from contact with Chinese laborers in the U.S. coalesced and gave rise to a

general attitude about the Chinese that was unfavorable.

But at the same time, in a very vague way, many Americans had some notion that China is an old civilization and has certain values and qualities that are admirable. This is in sharp contrast to the popular, pre-World War II image of "dark Africa" peopled by savages and cannibals.

Partly because of this ill-defined feeling about Chinese civilization, Americans had that sense of patronizing the Chinese, of helping them. That's why most Americans feel outraged now: "We tried so hard to help them, to befriend them. Look at the hospitals we built, the schools we built, all the missionary work and so on. And yet, under the Communists, they have turned around and become our arch-enemy." Many Americans find this friend-turned-enemy a slap in the face.

The Chinese Communists have rejected the Western experience for readily understandable reasons. They still have a chip on their shoulder. They cannot forget what happened 100 years ago, nor during the past 100 years. They feel the record of imperialism and colonialism is such that the account somehow must be settled. For the Western colonial powers to say, "Oh, that was just a phase that's over now, let's be friends" is unacceptable to the Chinese.

Insofar as the Chinese on the mainland today are concerned, they really don't care how you feel about them, as long as you don't regard them as a disintegrating, dying civilization. In their view, fear or hatred is much better than condescension or disregard.

Since World War II, there has been a great change in American attitudes toward the Chinese, largely because of the degree of self-improvement that the Chinese who remained in the U.S. accomplished in two or three generations. More significant, however, has been the influx of highly educated, highly sophisticated, articulate Chinese—government officials, businessmen, students. Because

of the Revolution in China, more and more of them chose to stay here. And so many of them have distinguished themselves, sometimes in rather spectacular manner—Nobel prize winner, multimillionaires, geneticists, chemists, doctors, academicians, etc. These Chinese were the first fruits of the modernization process of China.

There seems to be a general misconception on the part of non-Chinese that all the major changes in politics, economics, social life, religion and what not began with the Communist accession to power. In fact, many of the forces had been at work for a long, long time, beginning with the coming of the West. In one word, the process has been that of modernization, which is synonymous with Westernization. The Communists simply accelerated many of the processes already in operation—secularization, emphasis on science, acceptance of some of the fundamental Western concepts such as the dignity of the common man, equality between the sexes, emancipation of women. There have been additional ramifications, of course, which are peculiarly Chinese Communist, or more specifically, Maoist.

The first thing the Communists wanted to do was to change the outlook of the Chinese. The Chinese have been attached to their history. The Communists, like many of the reformers before them, believed that tradition is a "bundle" weighing too heavily on their backs and they could hardly make progress unless they threw it away. This means rejecting Confucianism as the dominant form of thought and accepting something new. Under Nationalism, it was the Three People's Principles (nationalism, livelihood, democracy); under Mao, it's Marxism, Leninism, Maoism.

It also means developing the consciousness of the nation state. Westerners have paid a great deal of attention to the family, "the cornerstone of Chinese civilization," you know. But, for the purpose of building up a cohesive, unified nation state, naturally modern

people have to de-emphasize the importance of the family as a social institution. The sense of allegiance of the people had to be directed to the nation state, rather than to the family, or the clan, or the village, which tended to be divisive rather than unifying.

As for "regimentation" in Chinese life, it's all a matter of values. The Chinese Communists are convinced one of the major weaknesses of China in the old days was its disorganization, the absence of a sense of social concern and social justice. Sun Yat-sen made this point: the Chinese do not form a nation. They are, as he put it, a sheet of loose sand. What the Communists try to do is instill into the minds of the Chinese a sense of discipline. Once you have that, they can be mobilized for whatever task the leadership believes must be accomplished. So all the regimentation, indoctrination and so on are directed against that one evil, the lack of cohesiveness as a nation and as a society.

You realize you have a problem, so you try to overcome it by introducing new ways of doing things. But it goes beyond that. The Communists are convinced that the Western experience is a bad one. For whatever its merits, they say, it is a degenerating, declining and demoralizing system. To them, the acquisition of the means of production or industrialization are not all-important; there is a larger problem involved: what kind of man you are going to have. They point to the social pathology of the West, the exploitation, the divorce rates, juvenile delinquency, rate of crime and urban problems.

What they are trying to do is build up a new China, which takes advantage of modern science and technology, without the disadvantages that usually follow, at least in the experience of the West or those non-Western countries that have succeeded in modernizing, such as Japan. For one thing, they want to eliminate the discrepancy between urban and rural sectors of the country. They also want to avoid the creation,

Utilizing popular forms of culture to point social morals include such examples as (left) the puppet plays of Fukien province (cooperation pays off); (center) a traveling Tibetan troupe (a wicked bailiff is exposed by the serfs); and (right) wall posters in Canton (caricatures of President Liu Shao-chi).



with urbanization, of what they call "bourgeoisie." The objective is to have China developed into many communes which are basically self-sufficient culturally, economically, in political organization, self-defense, etc. The commune also has strategic meaning: in the event of a holocaust, all won't perish because of the knocking out of a few major centers. Each commune, of course, is to be connected with lines of communication, transportation and so on. The commune is a rejection of the Western experience.

The popular character of cultural development ought to be stressed. The Chinese are not unaware of past accomplishments; what they are emphasizing is that culture must represent the people. That's why they call theirs a people's republic; it's the people that count. The Chinese are saying they don't want a few privileged individuals in the areas of art, drama, literature—however brilliant the achievements. They believe in the wisdom of the common people. They want to make everybody literate and beyond that to acquire the rudiments of cultural life.

A few years ago the Communists were keen about encouraging all kinds of people to write poetry. They published tens and thousands of poems by peasants, workers, semi-literates, housewives. From the point of view of the cultured person, if that was poetry, any commercial jingle is poetry. But the Chinese leadership is trying to remove from the minds of the common people—what they call the masses—this feeling of inferiority: that science is the work of the highly trained specialists and literature is the exclusive area for those who happen to have a good family background, access to books and higher education. So even in science now they emphasize the contributions and accomplishments of the common people—the skilled worker instead of a university-trained engineer. It's not that they have no use for the engineer; they tell themselves they need so many thousands more. But they are trying to remove the social gulf that's been separating the elite from the mass-

es. This is what Mao calls the mass line. If you follow the mass line, you're correct. If you don't, you're politically reprehensible.

It's a process of leveling off. The Cultural Revolution meant exactly that. They didn't want a new educated elite, however technically important or technically competent. At the time the Cultural Revolution broke out, the Communists thought many students were beginning to show signs of selfishness, pursuing education in order to get social position and the enjoyment of the material things of life. They were very worried about that. So they discarded the whole system and started anew.

Whether the Communists can succeed in changing man I have serious doubts. But China, although it calls itself a Marxist-Leninist state based on dialectical materialism, is idealistic. The Communists believe in the ability of man, once he has the will, to accomplish whatever he sets out to do.

And whatever the Chinese accomplish—whether the Communists or the Nationalists—all Chinese take a certain sense of pride. It's been said that at the time of the nuclear explosion in China, even the Chinese on Taiwan felt pride and glee that we, on our own, had come up with this. Remember, there's the historical burden. The Chinese have been looked down upon wherever they went. At best, they were treated with contempt; at worst, kicked around as inferior specimens. So no matter where Chinese find themselves, they especially take pride in whatever the Chinese, as a group, manage to accomplish.



Many of the masses at whom these messages are directed still work in traditional ways (right), as in irrigating these fields.





As the Chinese People's Republic celebrates its twentieth birthday, Chinese Communist leaders can look back on a twisted path of progress. They began with great hopes, some now being achieved, some still struggling at the wayside. A brief survey of that path reveals some significant accomplishments, but also some critical setbacks.

The twenty years can be divided into five distinct eras. First came a period of reconstruction, when the Communists had to remedy a classic case of inflation, restore an industry scoured by years of war, feed millions of refugees, and simultaneously establish control over the population while seeking to win its loyalty. The Korean War, when propaganda could be concentrated on a threatening external enemy—the American "imperialist aggressors"—was instrumental in consolidating acceptance of the new leaders.

Reconstruction was followed by what


the Communists called "socialist transformation." From 1953 to 1957, during the period of China's First Five-Year Plan, all but a minute fraction of her industry was brought under government control along with most commerce, agriculture was collectivized, and the Party extended its control to the lowest levels. New socio-political relations were established, with every individual of school age and above belonging to a small group which meets frequently for criticism and self-criticism, endeavoring to gradually instill new values and attitudes. This second period was marked by rising optimism and steady progress under planned, orderly development; ideology was deemphasized and skills, professionalism and material incentives prevailed.

Sputnik went up in October 1957. Mao Tse-tung interpreted this as the crucial point when the balance of forces in the world shifted over to the Communists' side; optimism reached its peak in China. In 1958, throwing out conventional planning approaches, Mao called for a "Great Leap Forward." The Chinese people were exhorted to expend

heroic efforts. Rural areas set up "back-yard furnaces" to manufacture iron and steel. Millions were mobilized to work on irrigation, road building and reclamation crash projects. Since professionals and their skills were being deprecated and because Mao and the Party had always looked suspiciously on bureaucrats, the over-stocked bureaucracy was reduced to a core, the rest being sent down to work on production lines in the new factories or to relieve the labor shortage in the countryside. And the People's Communes were established, with their communal messhalls and dormitory living—which lasted in most places only a few months.

1958 was easily China's most productive year. But the Great Leap nurtured within itself the seeds of three hard years, 1959-61. The heady enthusiasm of "moving into communism" and the pressures from above caused wildly exaggerated reports to be sent to the top. With no statisticians or experts left to evaluate them (They were in the fields), plans and quotas for 1959 based on the exaggerations were impossible to attain. The pressures grew; so did the

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exhaustion and confusion of the workers and peasants. What began as an astounding advance degenerated into economic chaos at an increasing speed in 1960; by the winter of 1960-61, millions of peasants were in a state of insurrection and the army had to be used to restore order. While the leaders placed the blame on natural disasters—near-record droughts and floods which did play havoc with crops—and occasionally on the lower level functionaries who “failed to implement properly” the leadership’s directives, at least equal blame can be placed at the feet of the leaders, especially Mao, who insisted on overworking everyone in China from 1958 to 1960.

The fourth era, one of quiet recovery from 1962 to 1965, was dominated by professionals and bureaucrats. By 1965, production had once again reached 1957 levels. But there were at least 100 million more people to feed, clothe and supply with the same production as in 1957.

China has been caught in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, the present era, since 1966. We have witnessed in recent years the Chinese Communist Party organization being purposely de-

stroyed by part of its leadership, almost a complete breakdown of order in the cities, a three-year moratorium on meaningful schooling for most students and finally, for the first time in history, the army rather than the Party running a Communist country. But while Mao’s Red Guards tore down the governmental apparatus, battled with workers and disrupted industry, one lesson had been learned from the Great Leap: the fundamental rhythm of peasant life and food production has been little touched by the Cultural Revolution.

China’s 650 million peasants, the vast majority of her people, are perhaps the ones most affected by Communist rule. The Communists brought peace and order to a countryside ravaged by warlords, bandits and wars since the nineteenth century. The exploitation of the peasantry by rapacious landlords and money-lenders, backed by the traditional governments, halted abruptly after 1949. The effect of widespread periodic famines from natural disasters has been mostly alleviated. But the agricultural policy of the Chinese Communists has also had its dark moments.

The stated goal of the Party has al-

ways been collectivized farming. However, learning from the traumatic USSR experience, the Chinese proceeded in stages, rather than all at once. The first stage was Land Reform during reconstruction, when the ancient Chinese philosophy of “Land to the Tiller” was finally carried out. This was also the time when many Chinese were killed, as Communist cadres incited the peasant masses to turn on the landlords physically. Thus was the power of the new regime graphically demonstrated. The redistribution of land, from which it is estimated sixty percent of the farmers benefited, was of immense psychological value in winning the peasants’ support.

Then Mutual Aid Teams were set up, wherein neighbors pooled tools, draft animals and labor at peak seasons. These gave way to cooperatives, in which tools and animals were commonly owned but land remained privately owned, with profits on the basis of contributions. By the mid-1950’s, cooperatives began to embrace the whole village and pressure was applied for all to join. Resistance arose at this point, with crops and livestock being destroyed. But there was nothing similar to the resistance and slaughter of the Kulaks in Russia when collectivization occurred. With the establishment of the communes in 1958, all rural private property disappeared other than the home and personal possessions.

The economic collapse following the Great Leap caused the leadership to shift fundamental priorities. Building China’s industry had been the core around which all economic policy was formulated until 1960. The crisis at that time, however, forced the leaders to import grain from Canada and Australia, and to reorient planning around agriculture as “the foundation of the economy.” Peasants were permitted to farm small plots for their own use and raise livestock at home. This situation continued to the present, with all land still collectively owned, but the peasants able to dispose of their own livestock and “private plot” produce on the open market. The political question has concerned how much fertilizer and feed shall the peasants invest in their own plots and livestock, and how much time away from the collective farming.

Rural social structure was similarly transformed piecemeal. The power of clan leaders always rested on control of clan-owned lands, which were confiscated and redistributed in the Land Reform. Lands owned by religious bodies were also confiscated, as were religious buildings except for the ancestral clan halls. The last vestiges of the old socio-

political structure were swept away in the Great Leap, when clan halls were commandeered by the communes, graves were plowed over, and the geographical scope of the communes went beyond the old social horizons of the peasants, the half dozen or so villages constituting a marketing area. New leaders appeared with the Party's expanded recruitment of poor peasants for leadership roles in the countryside, displacing the clan elders.

Traditional folk religion has been supplanted to a remarkable extent by the symbols of communism, Chinese style. The old kitchen gods are mostly gone, replaced by mass-produced busts of Mao and pictures of Communist heroes.

For most of China's peasants, life has been better since 1949. Except for the three bad years, the level of consumption has generally been above that of before, simply because the majority of Chinese peasants lived right at the subsistence line in the old days, constantly subject to the whims of nature and landlord. The return of order to the countryside, the reclamation of land and dissemination of new techniques to raise yields, and a more equitable distribution has ensured all a slowly rising level of living in the rural areas, as well as in the cities. By collectivizing in several stages, albeit rapidly, the Chinese Communists were able to overcome the peasant's attachment to his own land in a comparatively bloodless and effective fashion, while replacing old rural leaders with ones from the lower strata committed to the new regime. China has not relied on the use of widespread arbitrary terror to secure compliance, as in Stalinist Russia, but on social pressures and propaganda—backed by the unspoken and little used threat of force after the early years.

For most of China's urban dwellers, life has also improved since 1949. Again, this can be attributed partly to the restoration of peace and order. But the Communists' early emphasis on building industry absorbed many of the urban poor and unemployed. Expanding industrial production and socialist doctrines enabled the workers to take on some of the attributes of an elite class. In terms of wages, housing, pensions, medical care and insurance, and, therefore, in terms of status, industrial workers have been near the top of the heap in Communist China. The trade unions have at times fought strenuously for workers' welfare.

China received critical aid from the USSR in planning, implementing and financing the First Plan. But the Plan's concentration on modern industrial

plants was eventually seen as unrealistic in view of the abundance of cheap labor. With the Great Leap came a wide dispersal of industry and a new policy of "walking on two legs": simultaneously pushing indigenous, small-scale industry along with large, modern plants. As in any developing nation, attention has focussed on capital construction, with consumer goods secondary. When all Russian aid and advisors were withdrawn in 1960 as the Sino-Soviet dispute grew hot, the existence of this native industry helped lighten the blow to Chinese industrialization.

Industrial growth was rapid until 1958. But the disorders of the Great Leap Forward, the strained recovery, and the recent upheaval of the Cultural Revolution all slowed this growth considerably. The picture of industrial growth over twenty years is thus not particularly impressive, especially in view of the population growth from an official 583 million in 1953 to an estimated 800 million today. And the necessary short-run concentration on basic industry at the expense of consumer goods hardly helps to meet the demands of rising expectations. However, numerous or ostentatious possessions are not desirable in China, since they mark one as politically antisocialist and invite denunciation in the periodic mass movements. Therefore, consumer goods production has been essentially for the masses, not elites, and the fairly equitable distribution helps ameliorate the strains of uneven growth.

If the vast majority of workers and peasants have materially benefited under Communist rule, the relatively small bourgeoisie has not. There are still a few showcase millionaires, but much of the old middle-class now works as managers or technical experts. Their skills are needed and they are comparatively well off, but they are an obvious target in political crises.

Simply nothing good can be said of the development of Chinese culture under communism. Socialist realism, the subordination of literature and art to the political ends of the regime, has been as unattractive in China as in any other Communist country. A minority of the intelligentsia have fought back with satire, but most have acquiesced or remained silent. In 1957, declaring: "Let a hundred flowers bloom," Mao opened the gates to criticism of government activity. Expecting specific and helpful criticisms of bureaucracy, Mao was overwhelmed for one month with unrestrained attacks by the intellectuals on the Communist Party's monopoly of power. The gates slammed shut, purges abounded, and intellectuals have

since been submissive.

Education, on the other hand, advanced apace until 1966. Prior to 1949, education was distinctly for the minority. Since then, spaces in the conventional schools have increased manyfold, supplemented by extensive adult education and work-study or farm-study schools. Education was early recognized as the ultimate foundation on which modernization would be based and never in history has an assault on educational backwardness been mounted on such a massive scale so quickly. Not all the experiments were successful. And curricula sacrificed social sciences and humanities to the natural sciences and political study. Still, education—traditionally far more prized in China than in, say, the U.S.—was at last reaching the masses to lay the basis for future advances. Then came the Cultural Revolution and all schools—all schools—closed after June 1966. Those which have reopened study chiefly the thought of Mao.


It is perhaps this three year hiatus in education and its inevitable aftermath which will in the long run be the most drastic legacy of the Cultural Revolution. The end effect will be the slowing down of China's development for much more than three years. In light of China's general poverty and considering that there may well be one billion Chinese pressing on all resources long before the turn of the century, the road to prosperity and modernity looks long and hard. The Cultural Revolution occurred because, while everyone in China wants a prosperous modern China, the Maoists insist it must be a revolutionary prosperous modern China. Mao had watched the pristine revolutionary fervor of the guerrilla years die slowly after 1949, while the Party and nation became more and more like the abhorred Soviet system, well on the way to capitalism in Maoist eyes. The Chinese bureaucracy became increasingly stagnant, professionalism and skills were paramount, and the gap between leaders and masses appeared to be widening.

If, through the cataclysm of the Cultural Revolution, Mao has been able to ensure that the aging Communist leaders will be followed by truly revolutionary successors, the sacrifice of several years on that long road to a modern China will be justified in his eyes. No one can yet know whether he has succeeded. Power in China at the moment is a tentative and elusive thing, ready to adjust as events unfold. After twenty years, Communist China stands at a crossroads: professionalism or revolutionism. The dust of the Cultural Revolution still obscures which path she will follow.

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IS MAO "GOD" OF CHINA?

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Two questions about China commonly asked in Western countries are these: "Is Mao Tse-tung the God of China?" and "Is the Red Book the Chinese Bible?"

Many people combine these questions and answer in the affirmative. Reports from China frequently emphasize the fantastic devotion of the people to Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and his writings which are widely disseminated in the small volume, the *Quotations*.

Recently I discovered a particularly interesting example of aligning Mao Tse-tung with God in an Australian national newspaper's religious column. Although it is obviously a clever caricature it nevertheless serves as an illustration of the parallels that many people now make.

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"Chinese evangelist Mao Tse-tung claims to have won more than 700 million converts without leaving China. He has achieved this amazing success in a continuous series of crusades over the past 19 years, together with intensive follow-up campaigns. Despite his mastery of mass conversion techniques, Mao is basically self-effacing—he allows only one portrait of himself to appear in each copy of the Chinese Bible, the Red Book. Mao dislikes the institutional church, favoring instead huge evangelistic street rallies at which his Red Guard hot gospellers whip the worshippers to a frenzy. Mao and his followers deplore an insidious 'God is Dead' cult that is spreading through the provinces. After all, they know that he is still alive and well in Peking."

It is true that Mao has been elevated in Chinese eyes to the status of a god-figure and that his writings are exclusively regarded by the Chinese as the Truth, being their guide in all matters, whether they be social, political, phil-

osophical or cultural. But in some significant aspects it is misleading to call Mao the god of the Chinese people and to think that the book *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* is by content or by use anything like the Bible.

During our travels in China in January and February 1968, there was a continual diet of Mao Tse-tung every day and in every place; almost every action was supposed to be an application of Mao Tse-tung's thought. It was obvious that many of the people of China deeply loved Chairman Mao and it was possible to imagine 700 million people awake and asleep thinking of Mao Tse-tung continuously. I travelled, early in 1968, to Peking, Shanghai, Canton, Wuhan, Changsha, Tsinan, and to communes in the countryside. In these areas I visited exhibitions, factories and workers' homes; met with cadres, politicians and propagandists; inspected palaces, halls, harbors and army barracks; lived with students at universities and attended (continued on page 22)



WELCOME TO MAO'S CHINA





Many foreign visitors to China get their first impressions on the train from Hong Kong to Canton. When they cross the border (left, top), they are greeted by waitresses in the train station (bottom). These waitresses, identified as "Mao Tse-tung's Thought Propaganda Team," have worked out a series of songs, dances, skits, and readings from the ubiquitous "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung." On the air-conditioned train itself, the attendants carry on the evangelical campaign (center left, top) and passengers are encouraged to join them. A foreign actor (extreme left, top) gives an impromptu rendition of "The East Is Red," accompanied by a train attendant. Another attendant reads to a Dutch businessman (extreme left, bottom) from the little red book of Mao's Thoughts. Each session ends with a chant of "Chairman Mao [may he live] ten thousand years." Another such session is held upon arrival at the Canton station.



kindergartens, a school and a teachers' college. We lived in villages with the peasants on the communes, and in all places we wandered among the people in the shops and streets. In every place and on every occasion Mao was venerated in almost every conceivable way.

Unanimously the Chinese repeat that Mao is "the red, red sun in our hearts" and everywhere banners proclaim him "our great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman." At dozens of receptions song and dance groups performed "We love Chairman Mao," "Long, long life to Chairman Mao," "Our parents are dear but Chairman Mao is dearer" and the crowds in the streets welcomed us with friendly smiles and the chant "Chairman-Mao-Long-Life, Chairman-Mao-Long-Life, . . ." His works, besides technical textbooks, are the only books available. Despite our insistent proddings in literally thousands of conversations and questions we were not able to elicit one criticism of anything that Mao had written or done. I was presented thirty-three different Mao badges and heard on an average nine public quotations from the Red Book each day. By over a dozen incidents of accusation and trial against individuals in our Australian group we learned that criminal offences are summarized as "a thought or action that is contrary to Mao's thought."

I saw eleven churches in China. All of them were shut or in ruins, full of junk or converted to other purposes. There is no public meeting or worship by Christians in China or, for that matter, by any religious group, it seems. Maoism swallows minorities. Maoism is a total concept.

But if Mao is described as "the god of China" then clearly this "god" is very different from the God of the Christians. From the very nature of the Chinese people's regard for Mao it is confusing to say that Mao is their "god." Mao is more a hero-statesman, a philosopher-king, a Chinese Emperor, an "infallible" leader. Anna Louise Strong, an American who lives in China, knows Mao Tse-tung very well and is aware of the people's regard for him, told me her opinion on this question. "The most accurate title for Chairman Mao is 'helmsman.' The people are so devoted to Mao that they have many titles but I think 'helmsman' best summarizes them all and at the same time this is how Mao Tse-tung sees himself." Mao is the prophet not the Lord, the teacher not the Teaching, the pope not the God. The Chinese have always been a-religious; over so many dynasties the Chinese have been philosophers and social

organizers rather than priests and religious devotees. For example, the teachings of Confucius constitute ethical and philosophical maxims of a quite a-religious nature. Even Buddhism is nontheistic.

Communism is a-religious. Given this context for Chinese thought it is misleading to say that the Chinese regard Mao as "god" in a Christian or a Hindu sense. The Chinese do not perceive the Chairman as a reincarnation, as immortal or supernatural; he is not for them Creator of the world or its endpoint. And, although the people of China, waking and sleeping, think of Mao and refer to his thought for inspiration and guidance, they do not pray to him in any religious sense. There is a very apparent lack of superstition in their regard for him. Mao is a hard-working mortal man, a great politician, a national hero. To the Chinese he represents the enormous social achievements and the regained self-respect and independence of the Chinese people. He is the symbol of the revolution which he served as paramount leader. In China Mao has the status of an infallible political hero and thinker. There is, of course, no suggestion that he will achieve physical immortality.

Moreover, Mao Tse-tung himself reckons that he is not the God of China. He teaches that *the people* are God and everyone must serve the people. Of course, this is orthodox Marxism-Leninism and there is no doubt that the concept of "the people" is basic to all Chinese Communist theory and practice. The state, it is claimed, is a "proletarian dictatorship" where the arbiter of truth, the justifier of correct practice, the end of all activities and the source of power for all achievements is the people themselves, the 700 million workers and peasants, cadres and army members. Mao himself declares, "Our God is none other than the masses of the Chinese people" (Red Book, p. 202). Mao states that experience has taught that "the right task, policy and style of work invariably conform with the demands of the masses at a given time and place" (Red Book, p. 123). The only essential question is "What do the

people need and want?" Mao says, "Every word, every act and every policy must conform to the people's interest." In China the people themselves have been deified.

The differences between the Red Book and the Bible are legion. The two have different perspectives, and different types of claims. Moreover, there are differences in the way the books are used and in what they symbolize. The Red Book consists of 429 paragraphs quoted from Mao's writings between 1926 and 1964. Although it contains several ideological and cultural sections, it basically is a book about political methods, military tactics and social development. In the sense that it defines the Maoist system of belief and is studied universally by the Chinese, the Red Book bears comparison with the Christian scriptures. However, for any serious examination it is misleading to align the two books or to consider them comparable alternatives. They are quite different kinds of writing with different kinds of subject matter reflecting a great cultural gulf in their vocabularies and ideas.

The Red Book is designed to fill the vacuum in the minds of China's 700 million people who, as Mao writes, have "the outstanding characteristic of being poor and blank" (Red Book, p. 36), and to propagandize the world's peoples. The Red Book is primarily political dogma.

Most of Mao's writings make profitable reading and their frequent good sense seems particularly practical in the face of many Chinese problems. Christians would, at the same time, see some ideological perspectives and methods which are inadequate or disturbing, arrogant or pernicious. An assessment of Maoist philosophy is a most complex matter and it would be wrong to dismiss it with a superficial judgment. Any simplistic dismissal of this man or of his thought would constitute a failure to recognize either his conspicuous political successes or the serious inadequacies of a man-made political system subject to no transcendent judgment and locking a quarter of mankind into an ideological mold.

"Mao is the prophet not the Lord, the teacher not the Teaching, the pope not the God."

by r. bruce douglass

THE NEW MOMENT IN

RELATIONS SINO-AMERICAN

Mr. Douglass served for three years as Secretary of the Political Commission of the World Student Christian Federation and has traveled in East and Southeast Asia. The editor of *Reflections on Protest*, he is the coeditor of a book on Chinese politics to be published in 1970.



"I can't bear the thought of being hated by 700 million Chinese all at once."

From EVENING STANDARD, London

For almost two decades the policy of the United States Government towards the People's Republic of China has been a war policy. We have not always been shooting at the Chinese during this period, but we have made it clear that we stand ready to do so and expect the worst from them.

It has not always been this way, and there are reasons to believe that it might have been otherwise during the Fifties and Sixties if it had not been for the Korean War. In those critical months between the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean hostilities, both Peking and Washington edged towards normalization of relations. It was widely thought in Washington that it was only a matter of time until Peking's ambassador would arrive. Whatever Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime had meant in the past, there was no definite commitment to support it in the future. The new Chinese leadership were clearly Communists, "leaning to one side," as Mao put it, in the Cold War, but they did not rule out the possibility of peaceful relations with the United States. But then came Korea. The Seventh Fleet took up its position in the Formosan Straits, and the American campaign to isolate the new Chinese Republic was on. (The term "isolation" is in fact an understatement of the policy objective, which was, by Secretary of State Dulles' admission, to seek the internal collapse of the People's Republic.)

Today in mid-1969, there are signs that the period initiated by the Truman Administration's "neutralization" of Formosa may be coming to an end. Changes that have been taking place in China, East and South-East Asia, and the United States in the last couple of years have created a new situation, and the pressures for a new China policy are mounting. The chances are at least fifty/fifty that some sort of new China policy will emerge during the Nixon Presidency.

Clearly the most important single factor in the China policy equation today is the mood which the Vietnam War has created in American politics. As these words are written, Mr. Nixon is returning from his Asian junket, where he made clear his intention to "lower the profile" of the American presence in that part of the world. Behind the slogan lies his indication that Washington will not think enthusiastically about sending American soldiers to fight in Asian wars in the future and his refusal to make substantial aid commitments. As the

President returned to the White House, Secretary of State Rogers was reiterating at one stop after another Washington's desire for new discussions with Peking, and before the trip the Nixon Administration made a point of dropping a few of the restrictions on American trade and travel with China. The President characterized his trip as a "peace" mission, making clear his desire for new co-operation with Communist governments. All of this certainly reflects his reading of what is required of an American politician in the immediate post-Vietnam period. The country simply will not tolerate more of the "high" posture of the past decade. There is too much to be done at home and waning confidence in our capability to do abroad what we have been claiming to do.

Other factors figure in the equation as well. The China threat does not loom nearly as large as it once did. The Cultural Revolution has drawn China inward and turned the country upside down. A nation in this state is not likely to go warring on its neighbors. Moreover, the studied refusal of the Chinese to respond to the Vietnam provocation (the bombing of North Vietnam has been to China what the bombing of Mexico by a hostile power would be to this country) has made the argument for Chinese caution in military affairs more and more plausible. Time and again throughout this war, prophets of doom of both hawk and dove varieties have warned ominously that Chinese intervention and a Sino-American shooting war were imminent, yet the Chinese have refused to play out this role. The notion of "yellow hordes" marching down through South-East Asia, much less driving across the Pacific, seems less real every day.

Also, the politics of China policy have changed greatly in this country. One of the principal reasons why there has been no real change in American China policy since the Korean War is that a powerful coalition of pro Chiang Kai-shek forces in the Congress (mainly Republicans) blocked any initiatives for change. Another reason is that, with the exception of Eisenhower, the occupants of the White House during this period were liberals who were vulnerable to the charge of softness on Communism—a charge to which Democrats have been sensitive ever since Joseph McCarthy's assault on the China issue. And another reason is that the two principal Secretaries of State during this period—Dulles and Rusk—have both had deep personal antipathy towards any relaxation of our hostility to Chinese Communism. The tables are turned today. We have a

President whose anti-Communism is beyond question; most of the principal allies of Chiang Kai-shek in the Senate have died or retired; and the new Secretary of State, with his limited experience in foreign affairs, appears to be the least ideological and most pragmatic holder of that office in years. We have developing, moreover, in the Senate a formidable coalition of advocates of change—men like Fulbright and Javits and McCarthy and Kennedy and McGovern.

Such advocates of change find their way smoothed by the fact that consideration of the China issue in our public debate is much more informed and much less reflexive than it used to be. Through such forums as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on China in 1966 and the writings of influential figures like Fulbright, McCarthy, the Kennedys, Edwin Reischauer, we have passed through a good deal of public education on China in the last few years, and the liberal position has clearly predominated in much of this. Its ascent has been such that it has almost become a part of the "conventional wisdom" of our public life. As short a time ago as the early Sixties it was a fairly courageous act to advocate a UN seat for Peking (the National Council of Churches World Order Conference in 1962 was severely attacked for taking this stand), but today this is a standard gesture in all but the most conservative circles. Even *Time* magazine, which was founded by one of the leading figures of the old China lobby, has come around to an espousal of "containment without isolation" (June 6, 1969).

Finally, there is the possibility that Peking sees a new situation developing and is ready for change. We cannot be certain about this now. But it is significant that the Chinese Government made overtures to the Nixon Administration to renew the Ambassadorial-level talks at Warsaw (*and* that the Nixon Administration moved promptly to make a positive response). The invitation was, of course, later withdrawn by Peking, so we cannot know yet just how significant this new opening will be. But there are reasons for believing that behind this gesture lies a desire in Peking to break out of the self-imposed isolation of the past few years. With a new situation developing in Asian affairs, strife building between the Soviet Union and China, and Moscow-Washington detente proceeding apace, the figures that count in the Peking Foreign Office just may feel that it is high time to get back into the diplomatic stream of things. Interestingly, the proposal which it addressed to Wash-

ington was for discussion of the principles of peaceful co-existence.

The signs of the times are not unambiguous, of course. Not only did Peking eventually shut the door in Warsaw, but the Nixon Administration is saying and doing contradictory things in its rearrangement of American foreign policy. The President also talked about "standing proudly with Thailand against those who might threaten it from abroad or within," and Senator Fulbright has been claiming that Washington has entered into secret agreements that would commit substantial numbers of American troops to the support of the Thai Government in the event of attack. This is a country that many observers have considered the most likely "next Vietnam." The ABM deployment could well be considered by Peking as a provocation, especially since much of the propaganda for deployment has carried distinct anti-Chinese overtones. Both the President and the Secretary of State have indicated on a number of occasions, moreover, that this Administration will continue to oppose the admission of Peking to the UN.

So there is no assurance that we *will* have a new China policy in the course of the present Administration. Every American President since Eisenhower has paid lip service to the achievement of normalcy in Sino-American relations, but very little has been done to realize this goal. I remain convinced, however, that *even without a firm commitment to normalization in Peking* the present opportunity is a bigger one than any which has appeared in Sino-American relations since the Korean War, and that it is of such nature that it almost demands action. The achievement of even the most minimal program of "posture lowering" in Asia requires that Washington take steps towards the bettering of its relations with Peking. The President certainly must be aware of this.

But how much of change is likely? That is the key question—and the unanswerable one in mid-summer 1969. I think it is almost inevitable that the Nixon Administration will declare itself ready to realize parts of the liberal program. It will certainly continue to be ready to renew the Warsaw talks. If the Chinese co-operate in the least, it will probably lift more of the restrictions on trade and travel. Mr. Nixon's words at his first press conference to the contrary notwithstanding, there could be a gradual retreat from the position of active opposition to a UN General Assembly seat for Peking. There might even be overtures towards the opening of consultates eventually.

Theoretically, much, much more change could occur, but given the general caution with which this Administration approaches politically volatile issues like this, what I have just outlined seems to be an absolute maximum for at least the first four years. Much less could also happen. We could get no more than the absolute minimum: another installment of diplomatic talks without any substantive change in policy. The Warsaw talks dragged on, after all, for many years, with no tangible results. And this is not a policy stance which need be incompatible—in the public mind, at least—with Mr. Nixon's desire to "lower the posture" in Asia. That slogan could turn out to mean little more than a change in the style of our activities in East and South-East Asia. The substance could remain much the same, with Washington falling back on the alibi that it is Peking which is intransigent.

Speculation about the future of our China policy is so difficult because of the indeterminacy of the impact of the Vietnam war on the American political mood. There undeniably has been an impact, but what does it amount to? It seems clear that it will be impolitic for an American President to advocate or initiate direct American troop involvement in Asian civil wars in the foreseeable future. But do the effects of the war extend further? Does this revulsion carry through to a rejection of the larger policy stance we have maintained in that part of the world over the past two decades? Has the political mood shifted to such an extent that it will now be possible for an American politician to accept countries like the Philippines and Thailand and Indonesia working out their political and economic problems in liaison with Peking as well as (or even instead of) Washington? Has the situation changed to such an extent that we would not be nervous about a publicly acknowledged Chinese Communist presence in non-Communist Asia? These are imponderables, as far as I can see. The significance of this war for American politics is much less clear than, say, World War II for European colonial empires. We shall not be able to say what this war has meant for our political life for at least another decade. My hunch is, however, that the immediate meaning of the war can be confined to the revulsion against more war in Asia; that this is not related in any clear way to the larger questions of Asian policy, much less our policy in other areas; and that any larger meanings which are attached to this mood will result from the public debate in the aftermath of the war. Definition of those larger meanings could well turn

out to be one of the major themes of the public debate in the early Seventies.

For the long-term future of our China policy the main question is whether or not the meaning of Vietnam will be defined in such manner that the containment of China (particularly the military aspects) can be criticized and eliminated—or at least greatly revised. A great deal can be done to improve Sino-American relations without ever confronting the problem of containment: on this much the advocates of "containment without isolation" are correct. If the bilateral talks are approached in the right mood, and Peking comes to the conclusion that good faith has finally emerged in Washington (which it doubted when the talks broke off), I doubt that they will demand all or nothing. There will be room for negotiation on such things as the principles of peaceful co-existence, trade and travel relations, exchange of consultates, etc. But if there should be progress on such issues as these, the discussions will eventually turn to the bigger issues, and we shall learn that from Peking's point of view the real bone of contention is not isolation but containment.

To be more specific: again and again the statements on Sino-American relations appearing in the Chinese press indicate that the real problems are the threat to Chinese security posed by the over one million U.S. servicemen stationed around China's borders and the intervention in the Chinese civil war represented by America's defense of the Nationalists on Formosa. I have no space here to deal with these difficult questions in the depth they deserve, and it would be talking in the air to outline detailed proposals at this stage. These are matters which under ideal conditions would require the whole of the next decade to handle satisfactorily. It suffices to say this much: a durable Sino-American peace will require drastic reduction of the apparatus of military containment of China, adoption of the principle that Asian security must be in the first instance the concern and responsibility of Asian governments, and the termination of an American military presence on Formosa. Does this mean a total American pull-out from Asia? No. It means instead an American presence in Asia in primarily non-military forms. Does it mean abandonment of Formosa to a take-over by Peking? No. I think the Chinese Communists are wise enough to exclude any direct intervention from the mainland for the foreseeable future, Seventh Fleet or no Seventh Fleet. For a while they probably would be content to see that island related economically to the capitalist world, and there could

well be at some distant date an accommodation between Peking and Taipei along lines that cannot be foreseen in 1969. Peking knows quite well what it means to allow one's adversary to lose with "face."

In all of this, the other great unknown is of course Peking's response to American initiatives. Only the superficial observer in this country, cut off as it has been from direct contact with Chinese Communists for so long, can assert confidently what opinions will prevail in the policy councils of the People's Republic—especially after the death of Chairman Mao. But at the same time I think it must be said that the inscrutability and unpredictability of the Chinese has been greatly over-emphasized. This has become the lazy man's way of avoiding serious reflection. As Professor Reischauer commented recently, this is a blatantly racist notion. We once said it about the Japanese, yet today we have learned to think of the government in Tokyo as quite comprehensible and predictable. Communism makes a difference, but not *that* much. By studying what Peking says we can learn a great deal about what it wants. It has made no secret of its concerns for the future of Asia, and I think we can rely upon those intentions. We can also rely upon the fact that the Chinese are not uncompromisingly hostile towards the American people or their government. The notion of implacable hostility is a myth. What is implacable is their hostility towards those who would tamper with China's security. If one studies the record of Sino-American relations since, say, 1945, one finds that the Chinese Communists have made shifts in their policies towards Washington, and that many of those shifts reflect a desire for accommodation. They certainly have a grossly inadequate view of the nature of American society and have frequently made errors that exacerbated the tensions between the two countries. But they have also looked—and not infrequently—for occasions to make a fresh start.

I have no doubt that the sources of the conflict between the United States and the People's Republic go even deeper than containment and Formosa. Two dynamic but very different civilizations collide in the encounter between these two nations, and each finds it difficult to live with the other because of its pride and evangelical zeal. Probably only in the time of our grandchildren will enough mutual assimilation have taken place for them to adjust fully to one another. In the meantime, we had better seize our opportunities for peace when they are given to us.



ART SERVES THE REVOLUTION

One of the more remarkable examples of art serving the cause of propaganda in the new China is an exhibition of life-size clay statues, *The Rent Collection Courtyard*. Originally located in the courtyard of a rich landlord in Szechuan Province in Southwestern China, these series of tableaux remind the peasants of the injustices they suffered under the old regime and condemn the landlords.

Arranged in six scenes, the more than one hundred sculptured figures are socialist realist art. The work of a group of artists who spent months living with the peasants, they serve the purposes of the state. At the same time, their power and feeling cannot be denied. They have been widely copied in smaller sizes throughout China and an expanded version of the exhibit has been set up in the capital city of Peking. Here are some selections:



by James C. Hsiung

Dr. Hsiung is chairman of the
East Asian Studies Program at
New York University.

HOW CHINA VIEWS THE WORLD



THE GENERAL LINE OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY IS: TO DEVELOP RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION AMONG THE COUNTRIES IN THE SOCIALIST CAMP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM; TO STRIVE FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE FIVE PRINCIPLES WITH COUNTRIES HAVING DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND OPPOSE THE IMPERIALIST POLICIES OF AGGRESSION AND WAR; AND TO SUPPORT AND ASSIST THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES OF ALL THE OPPRESSED PEOPLES AND NATIONS.

WE ARE ALWAYS WILLING TO DEVELOP ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES AND SUPPLY EACH OTHER'S NEEDS ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY, MUTUAL BENEFIT AND MUTUAL RESPECT FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.



What was Confucian China's attitude toward foreign states?

Because of past history in which China never had much contact with the outside world—her only contacts were with people of lesser civilization—the Chinese came to a very strong, deep-seated sense of superiority. So when the Westerners came during the nineteenth century, the Chinese thought they were meeting with but another group of barbarians. They resisted requests for trade and contact with the Western powers in the beginning. Later they were defeated in a number of wars by the Western powers. They found it impossible to maintain contact with the West on an equal footing. It was the reverse situation.

By 1912, when the Manchu empire crumbled and the so-called Republic emerged, there was really a period of chaos. China was divided between different warlord factions until the Nationalist government came into being in 1928. After 1928 the Nationalist government attempted to modernize China and to see China as one of many nation states in a world community, rather than one that was superior.

What does China regard as her legitimate sphere of influence?

Traditionally the Chinese concept of the Chinese empire extended to today's Indochina, Burma and Mongolia. Burma was part of the Chinese empire until it was annexed by England under a treaty during the nineteenth century. Mongolia was under Chinese suzerainty until it was recognized as an independent state in 1945 as the result of prior agreement reached at Yalta, which was not participated in by China. During different periods of time today's Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia lived under Chinese influence and certain parts of Indochina were under direct Chinese control. Chinese influence in Thailand was never very direct but still considerable. Chinese influence in Tibet was indirect but real and China always considered Tibet as being under Chinese suzerainty.

Now I don't think the Chinese Communist leaders still consider Indochina or Burma part of China but they do consider Tibet to definitely be part of China. And they have raised serious claims that the Mongolia situation must be reviewed. This doesn't mean that they deny the fact that China in 1945 under the Kuomintang government did recognize the independence of Mongolia. But they are insisting that China, Mongolia and Russia must come to some

kind of new agreement. I don't know whether they mean Mongolia should return to China or what, but at least they have made the claims and they have repeatedly raised this problem.

I don't think China considers Korea part of the Chinese empire anymore. But in view of the recent Sino-Soviet conflicts over the Ussuri boundary, I think we can safely say the Communist leaders in Peking today want the big tracts of land lost to Czarist Russia returned to China.

Do you think war with Russia will be avoided?

I think war can be avoided if some kind of a modus vivendi can be worked out. I don't think the Russians will go so far as to return the huge tracts of land—the maritime provinces and the regions east of the Ussuri River and north of the Heilungkiang (Amur) River. The Chinese of course consider the treaties of 1850-60 under which the lands were turned over to the Russians to be unequal treaties, which they claim are not valid and must be renegotiated. So probably in the end, in the very, very distant future, some redrawing of the boundary will have to be done if China and Russia will live in peace again. This will have to be after Mao.



China's view of foreigners runs the gamut of hate and love. On the one hand, young children (left) are taught songs of hate toward U.S. imperialists, though they do not know what imperialism might be. And the American pilot is the bad guy in many Chinese plays (opposite page, extreme left). On the other hand, a billboard at a China Export Commodities Fair in Canton (opposite page, bottom center) claims China wants "peaceful coexistence" and "mutual respect for national sovereignty." And a statue of the only foreigner highly regarded by the Chinese Cultural Revolutionaries, the late Canadian surgeon Dr. Norman Bethune (opposite page, bottom right) is even given a slightly Chinese cast of features.

It has been suggested by some people in this country that the U.S. must exploit the Soviet-Chinese dispute. But we need a balance of power between ourselves and the Soviets, between the Soviets and the Chinese, and the Chinese and the United States. I think it's good we have the three-way tangle. If we realize the importance of a balance of power, perhaps we would be more willing to accept the fact that China will have to have a place in world power politics. The sooner, the better.

What is the chief barrier to improved U.S.-China relations?

The main hitch in the relations between Peking and Washington has been the Taiwan question. The Communist leaders want the U.S. to leave Taiwan, to withdraw its fleet and terminate its mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China. Of course the U.S. will not do that and cannot afford to do that. This has created a stalemate and has obstructed the bilateral talks between the U.S. and Chinese Communist representatives at Warsaw which have been on and off for the past 14 years. Taiwan is still the issue standing in the way.

Is an independent Taiwan realistic or even possible?

I would like to address myself to this question as one who came from the mainland of China and stayed in Taiwan from 1949 to 1958, and also as a person who is watching both sides of the Taiwan strait in the current Chinese scene. An independent Formosa is not really desirable, not really realistic. It is true that many of the so-called Formosans are dissatisfied with the cur-

rent situation in Taiwan and the so-called Formosan Brotherhood Movement or Independent Formosa Movement shows the kind of frustration or dissatisfaction with the reality. I sympathize with their feelings.


But this doesn't mean that the so-called Formosans do not realize they are Chinese; they have the same culture, they speak the same language. The so-called Formosans are simply descendants of the earlier settlers in Taiwan. And the so-called Mainlanders are simply more recent settlers in Taiwan. So if we let our rationality make the decision for us, and not our emotions, I think Taiwan should belong to China. Then it's a matter of which government of China. But from the historical point of view, Formosa has been part of China except for 50 years of Japanese rule. Of course neither Taipei nor Peking will accept an independent Taiwan.

What is China's attitude toward the United Nations?

Roughly from 1949 to 1954, China wanted to have its delegation accepted at the UN. From China's point of view it was never a matter of admission; it was a matter of regaining Chinese representation in the UN. But this did not succeed. China realized its international isolation was the reason it couldn't gain its seat in the UN, so it wanted to cultivate friendship with the Third Camp states, the Afro-Asian nations. At the Bandung Conference in 1955 Chou En-lai launched a peace offensive in an attempt to break that isolation. This didn't lead anywhere either.

From 1959 on, because of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Soviet-U.S. de-

China's "free press" is what is known as a wall newspaper. Here, schoolchildren in Loyang read a Chinese verse lampooning a well-armed U.S. soldier who has his nose in a book. On the right, U.S. Presidents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson hurl bombs at Korea, Cuba and Vietnam.



tente, China's sense of isolation deepened. In 1963 the partial nuclear ban treaty was signed, and that was a sign to the Chinese, because in a way that treaty meant that Moscow went along with the U.S. in an attempt to stop China's nuclear program. China began to see the UN as dominated by a collusion between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Chinese have talked about an independent world organization outside the UN, but no action has ever been taken. Looking to the future, I don't think they have given up hope they will be seated at the UN, but for the moment it's politic not to talk about it.

Will China export revolution to the Third World?

This is a very interesting question. I think it has been misunderstood in the West. I'm not trying to minimize the impact of the Chinese Communist theory of national liberation movements, but I do want to point out a very important point that has often been missed. We hear Mao's words quoted to the effect that we must "support world revolution," "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," and things of that nature.

But what has not been fully appreciated is that Mao is saying this: "From our experience political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. And from our experience, the Chinese Communist revolution succeeded not because of foreign aid but because of our self-reliance, not because we were supported by any one center of international Communist revolution or international Communist movement, but because we correctly applied Marxist-Leninist theory to the concrete situation in China. So if we did this, why can't you leaders of the revolutions elsewhere do the same?"

In a way Lin Piao's famous speech of 1955, *Long Live the Victory of the People's War*, was offered as an exhortation to the Vietnamese brethren, the Vietnamese Communist leaders, telling them: "You should rely on your own resources; don't count on us; don't think that we will intervene to help you bring your revolution to a successful end."

Now this is nothing strange if we know Chinese history. Mao, despite his disclaimers, despite his efforts to change Chinese traditions and despite his claims that he wants to break away from China's past, has knowingly or unknowingly followed the traditional style of leadership, which is to lead by ideology, by giving a good example, by providing inspiration to the followers, rather than to do the work for others.

by Chen Lung-chu

SHOULD FORMOSA BE INDEPENDENT?

The Chinese began to migrate in substantial numbers to Formosa in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. During the seventeenth century, various foreign Powers, notably the Portuguese, Spaniards and the Dutch, as well as dissident Chinese forces, vied for control of the island. In 1683 the Ch'ing Dynasty formally annexed Formosa and kept it under very loose control for about two centuries. As a consequence of the Sino-Japanese war, Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, and remained to be its colony till the end of World War II. When Japan surrendered in 1945, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was authorized by the Allied Command in the Pacific to occupy Formosa as an exercise of the right of belligerent occupation of the Allied Powers. In 1949 Chiang and his cohorts were driven out of the mainland and sought refuge in Formosa. When the Korean War broke out in June, 1950, President Truman proclaimed "the neutralization of Formosa" by dispatching the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits to prevent any attack on Formosa and any military operations from Formosa against mainland China.

Though both Chinese Nationalists and Communists claim that Formosa is an integral part of China, a stronger case, as urged by Formosans and some major powers, appears to be that the legal

status of Formosa has been undetermined after formal detachment from Japan and that the principle of self-determination should be applied to settle this. Formosa's uncertain status has continued as the world moves from crisis to crisis and the United Nations fails to find a proper solution regarding China's participation. Since the emergency arrangements that originated in military occupation are not yet normalized, the Nationalist regime continues to exercise control over Formosa.

In the past years, the Nationalist regime has had every opportunity to obtain a popular mandate from the people of Formosa, if it so chooses. Thus far it has been neither willing nor able to obtain such a mandate. Indeed, it is an exile government without the consent of the governed.

Under the political myth that "the Nationalist government remains the only legitimate government of China representing all Chinese and Taiwan is only one of the 35 provinces of China," the constitutional structures and personnel prevailing on the mainland in 1949 have continued to operate in Formosa without change.


The Republic of China, as it is styled, has under its effective control only Formosa, with a population of 14 million, of which 12 million are Formosans (Taiwanese) and 2 million are Mainlanders (mainland Chinese). The public will of these 14 million people has supposedly been reflected during the past two decades by the congressional representatives elected 20 years ago by the electorate on the mainland. Under Nationalist rule, the 85 per cent Formosan

majority has less than one and one-half per cent representation in the top level decision-making process in Formosa.

As might be anticipated, some spokesmen for the Formosans have demanded that the Formosans effectively participate in political decision making at every level. These demands have time and again been dismissed by the Nationalist regime on the ground that the existing Constitutional situation, though indeed extraordinary, is no more than temporary. Its position is that as soon as the Nationalist government "recovers" the lost territory on the mainland, there will at once be a nationwide election and Taiwan, of course, will be included. Hence, the regime argues further, the proper solution lies in marshalling every effort to achieve what is professed to be the common goal, "a return to the mainland." Meanwhile, the Formosans are told to be grateful that they are after all given voting rights to elect local officers and members of the "Provincial Assembly" of Taiwan. (Incidentally, although Taiwan is alleged to be a "Province" by the Nationalists, the people of Taiwan do not enjoy the right to elect their own Governor. The Governor has been appointed, as a rule, from among top Nationalist generals by President Chiang Kai-shek.)

This "grand scheme" is both brash and subtle. If the veil of fiction is pierced, the obvious result is to perpetuate the monopoly of power by the Nationalists. Incredibly as it seems, to demand realistic and reasonable modification of the obsolete Constitutional structures for the purpose of giving the Formosan people command of their own

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One of the few points on which the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist government of Mao Tse-tung agree is that Taiwan (Formosa) is a part of China. The proponents of an independent Formosa are either advocates of a "Two China policy" in international affairs or native Formosans. Professor Chen presents the viewpoint of the latter; Professor Hsiung (preceding article) argues the opposing point of view. This billboard in the grounds of the Summer Palace in Peking shows American military support of the Chiang regime on the island—a sore point to the Mao government.

affairs is to engage in "sedition" and "treason," crimes subject to court-martial and a maximum penalty of death.

It is surprising that the denial of self-determination to the Formosan people has aroused little world concern. Primarily this can be explained by the efficiency with which the Nationalist regime has exploited its monopoly of diplomatic and communication channels, and the rigor with which any attempt by Formosans to make their grievances and aspirations known to the world has been suppressed.

To many of Chiang Kai-shek's followers, Formosa under Nationalist rule is free and democratic. But it is no secret to any perceptive student of Formosan affairs that the Chinese Nationalist regime is notorious for its one-man dictatorship, family dynasty, and one-party rule. The mass massacre of Formosan leaders from all walks of life (more than 10,000 according to conservative estimates) by the Nationalist occupation authorities in "the 228 uprising" of 1947 has been followed by a systematic and totalitarian police control. Indeed, a formal state of emergency under martial law has been imposed on the Formosan people since 1949; thus, virtually all civil and political liberties are denied.

Despite the seeming effectiveness of Nationalist police control, many dissatisfied elements are developing. Formosans' indignation is most strikingly aroused during the military service, where discrimination against Formosans is most conspicuous. It is generally estimated that the Nationalist forces in Formosa number around 600,000. Though to an overwhelming extent the officer corps is still composed of Mainlanders, Formosans account for more than 80 per cent of the rank and file. Despite Chiang Kai-shek's unceasing agitation that invasion of the mainland is "imminent," the Formosans see only too clearly that Chiang's professed goal of mainland reconquest is a political hoax designed to perpetuate his monopoly of power. Deeply attached to their home island, Formosan soldiers will pay any price in the defense of Formosa and its people. But they want no part as stooges in a suicidal attempt to overthrow a regime that is in effective control of 750 million people on the Chinese mainland.

Hundreds of thousands of young men with adequate military training and experience, cherishing a single-minded resentment against the Chinese Nationalists, will in due course prove to be a valuable asset for Formosa's independence and development. (The Nationalist regime has recently proposed to extend compulsory military service to female

citizens coming of age.) They will not move prematurely—they are preparing for the day that they can act decisively in concert with their fellow Formosans abroad. (According to a dispatch dated April 12, 1969 from Taipei by a correspondent for *The New York Times*, Taiwanese opposition to the Nationalist rule is "evident by the surveillance exercised by the regime over all political and intellectual activity. The security police regularly arrest and imprison for protracted periods those who express opposition to mainlanders' rule and mainland policies."

Thousands of Formosan intellectuals studying or working abroad have made efforts to express Formosans' genuine grievances and aspirations to the world. Their efforts are symbolized by the evergrowing strengths of the organizations dedicated to the cause of an independent Formosa through self-determination, including the United Formosans in America for Independence, United Young Formosans for Independence (in Japan), Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe, and Committee for Human Rights in Formosa (in Canada). Though the pro-Nationalist elements are still very active in the U.S., Formosans have begun to be heard.

The world is changing rapidly, so is Formosa. A serious U.S. attempt to normalize relations with Communist China, a U.N. move in the direction of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Formosa," or the death of Chiang Kai-shek is likely to precipitate a major crisis in Formosa, driving the Nationalists to greater international isolation and internal insecurity, and accelerating Formosans' collective efforts for self-determination and independence.

When and if the Nationalist regime could no longer effectively suppress a unified popular opposition, a new development is by no means out of the question. Desperate leaders, some of whom are near the top, and who have a long background of equivocal relations with the Communist world, may very well negotiate for assistance with Peking. Confronted with such a contingency—a sellout of Formosa by the Nationalists to Peking, the response of the Formosan people and the United States would be crucial. The possibility that the United States might be pressured—by the neo-isolationist element and the element anxious to seek a long overdue accommodation with Peking at any price—into inaction and total withdrawal from the Formosa area cannot be ruled out. But, given the determined self-help of the Formosans themselves, and given the many security interests the U.S. has acquired in East

Asia and in the world and her national tradition in defense of human rights, it is most likely that the United States will continue the presence of her Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits so as to deter Peking's military action across the Straits and frustrate the Communist-Nationalist conspiracy, culminating in support for the Formosan people in their struggle for survival and the emergence of an independent Formosan state.

As an independent state in law and fact, the leaders of the new Formosa will unequivocally renounce any claim over mainland China, thereby ceasing to offer dangerous and futile provocations to mainland China. It is essential to world security that Formosa and mainland China be recognized as distinct political entities both in name and fact. A continuing national interest of the U.S. is to strengthen Formosa as an integral link in the Western Pacific defense line, including Japan and the Philippines. The purpose is to contain Communist expansion, not to prepare a takeoff point for attacking the Chinese mainland.

An indispensable task for the new leaders of Formosa will be to bring home to the nation that it is in the common interest of the two million Mainlanders and the 12 million Formosans to live, work and cooperate with one another. A pre-condition for the realization of such an ideal is to assure the mainlanders of effective and equal participation in the political process of the Formosan Republic, as well as in other sectors of social and economic life. No longer split into an exile faction cherishing delusions of faded grandeur, and a majority denied freedom of expression, a realistic commonwealth can arise from cooperative devotion and effort. Such urgent problems as the spectacular and formidable burden of military expenditures, the fantastic duplication and conflict of government structures, the lurking crises of economic imbalance and explosive population growth could be tackled directly, rather than sidestepped and postponed to a mythological Utopia called the "recovery of the mainland."

An independent Formosa that is crystallized and sustained by the popular efforts of the Formosan people—rather than one that is another form of Nationalist rule, or one that is a fabricated outcome of U.S. strategy—will gain wider international acceptance, including eventually that of new leadership in Peking. The materialization of "one China, one Formosa" in fact and in law will hence terminate the China-U.S.-U.N. entanglement.

WILL RUSSIA AND CHINA

COLLIDE?

This is a second in a series of Dispatch News Service reports (the first was in July, page 50) on Southeast and East Asia.

In the short space of four months, Communist China and the Soviet Union have made clear to the world that a major war between themselves is distinctly possible.

Border clashes in which troops on both sides have been killed have sent analysts scurrying to their history books to trace the roots and pattern of the conflict in an effort to predict the future course.

I spoke in Hong Kong to three experts—an Englishman, German, and American—men whose job is to analyze and report to their governments on currents in China.

They were substantially in agreement on the major questions relating to the border issue—that chances of a Sino-Soviet war have greatly increased in the past few months, that the Chinese do not want a war, and that the decision to strike rests on the Kremlin.

They also agree that the possibility of talks on the border question are practically nil, despite the call from both sides for talks. They see the stated positions and proposals for dealing with the issue as irreconcilable.

The Chinese argue that talks must deal with the entire 4,500 mile long border. They insist the Russians admit that border treaties signed a century ago are unequal because they were im-

posed on a weak Imperialist China by a strong, expanding, Tsarist Russia. As a result of the treaties, the Chinese were forced to cede to Russia land three times the size of France.

But to prove how reasonable they are, the Chinese have relinquished their claim on this land with the argument that Russian laborers having lived on it for a century are entitled to it. This gesture then highlights what the Chinese are really after—not territory, but an admission that the Russians have dealt highhandedly with them in the past. A propaganda point perhaps, but important to the Chinese in their effort to set the historical record straight and exact concessions in the future.

The Chinese case rests on showing that it's a historical repeat, or continuation, with Russian leaders today in the role of new Tsars carrying out the same imperialism and aggressive policies of the old Tsars. To heighten the historical parallels, the Chinese have carefully nourished their image of themselves as victims in this recent series of border clashes.

The Chinese approach is seen most clearly in the recent film "The Anti-China Atrocities of the New Tsars" which continues to show throughout China and recently ended a one-month run at Communist-owned theaters in

Hong Kong.

In the film, Chinese fishermen are seen attacking Russian tanks with sticks and gunboats with hatchets. It's no coincidence that a photographer is close behind recording these injustices of the mighty Russian military machine against unarmed Chinese peasants.

But the all-important difference is that these victims are armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung. With religious insistence, the Chinese claim right conquers might, making the implications clear for East European satellite countries and the Central Asian satellite Mongolia facing the threats of the Russian bully.

Whether or not Mao's thought is a match for Russian tanks remains to be seen. In the meantime, the Soviet Union will have nothing to do with talk about "unequal treaties," insisting that the present frontier as it developed historically must be respected. They will play their strong suit—guns, and Mao will continue to rely on the masses as he has done in the past. The Russians rapidly move troops into the border areas while the Chinese—with a population of 750 millions compared to Russia's 240 millions—send people. It boils down to guns versus population. The Russians say they want talks—but only to deal with individual, potentially explosive

'RATIONALIZE IT! IF WE DON'T FIGHT THEM HERE WE'LL BE FIGHTING THEM IN DOWNTOWN MOSCOW—WE HAVE TO CONTAIN CHINESE COMMUNISM IN ASIA . . . !



points along the border that are in need of demarcation.

How seriously do the Chinese regard the threat of a Soviet military strike? The American analyst sees the invasion of Czechoslovakia as a turning point in the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. The doctrine of limited sovereignty advanced by the Soviet Union as its excuse for the invasion struck home in Peking. The possibility of the Soviet Union undertaking similar action against a province or area of China appeared much greater. The Russian action created new tension which tore away the remaining shreds of flexibility with which each country could deal with border disputes.

Travellers arriving in Hong Kong from Canton report slogans pasted all over asking the people to prepare for war. Bomb shelters are being constructed in the suburbs of Canton and Communist officials are teaching people how to avoid losses during air raids.

Sabre-rattling members of the Soviet general staff are reportedly arguing that the best time for a military strike is now—not three or five years later when Chinese nuclear capacity will have increased manyfold. The military advantage clearly rests on the Soviet side.

Despite Chinese protestations, faith in Mao and reliance on a "spiritual atom bomb" is no match for the three hundred

Russian nuclear missiles positioned 350 miles from Peking on the Mongolian border or the superior Soviet armored strength and highly mechanized forces.

These are the military facts of life in border areas that have the Chinese worried:

—The recent buildup of Soviet ground strength from twelve understrength divisions on the frontier to about twenty-eight full-strength divisions. There has been no comparable Chinese buildup.

—Russian nuclear missiles positioned on the Mongolian border.

—Construction, strengthening, and extending of new and existing air bases along the border from which the Soviet Union flies constant patrols by fighter bomber and reconnaissance aircraft.

—The closing of the Trans-Siberian Railroad on June 1st to all but military traffic, indicating hurried military movements of equipment, supplies, and personnel.

There is little doubt the Russians are tempted to upset the Peking leadership, knock out nuclear installations in Sinkiang (China's northwestern province), and perhaps even occupy Sinkiang. But the difficulties of maintaining supply

lines to the interior of China and the possibility of becoming involved in a people's war against the vastly greater Chinese population are regarded as strong deterrents.

China is thought by some analysts here to have taken the Russians on in the March clashes to exploit centrifugal forces within the Soviet bloc, expose Russian weaknesses, and thus undermine the Soviet leadership. The Chinese in retrospect are seen to have used the clashes also to promote internal unity, rally support for the central leadership, and spur agricultural and industrial production.

But if China did provoke the latest clashes, and the feeling is growing that she did, then she made a mistake. That is the feeling of observers here who see the Russian bear not easily pacified once aroused.

Do the Russian people really believe China is expansionist? The Soviet military and political leadership can't seriously believe China poses a threat, says the British analyst. "But the people do. It's a built-in psychosis among Slavic people. They have a deathly fear of the Chinese. They sing songs to their children of golden Mongol hordes coming from the East. In the same way we tell our children to be good or the policeman will come, they say the Chinese will come."

A SYMPOSIUM WITH

FELICIANO V. CARINO
POIKAIL J. GEORGE
SABAM SIAGIAN



Feliciano V. Carino, of the Philippines, is Secretary for Student World Relations of the Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the USA.

Poikail J. George, of India, is Associate for Social Policy Development, Experimental and Specialized Services, of the Executive Council of the Episcopal Church.

Sabam Siagian, of Indonesia, is Staff Analyst for Political and Military Affairs with the Indonesian Mission to the United Nations.

Given the qualification that the Chinese experience cannot be duplicated, is there anything coming out of the China Revolution and history that bears on Asian modernization as a whole?

CARINO: Yes. China today stands as one of the few really independent nations of the world after the period of Western colonial domination. She has, in short, dealt with the issue of the "aftermath of colonialism" much better than anyone else. Mobilization and use of the peasantry—as opposed to "industrial workers"—as the mass base of revolution is a mark of the Chinese revolution so significant in the context of the pre-industrial situation of most Asian countries. The cultural character of colonialism has become a mark of China's response to the West in the last decades which, in the Chinese experience, means that there is also a need for "cultural revolution" if the political and economic innovations are to work.

Recent events in China have also indicated very significant themes which are very important for the future of the developing world, for example, the relation between ideology and technology, the meaning of education for the people, the issue of nationalism and internationalism, of military strategy and imperial threat for Asia, and the interaction between tradition and modernization.


GEORGE: Yes. An important lesson is that political independence is inadequate and incomplete without also economic and cultural independence. India has been one of the first of the formerly colonized nations to achieve political independence. It has adopted a democratic political system which has functioned reasonably well thus far. However, India has never achieved total

economic or cultural independence and as a result it has not become very strong internally or externally. Most of the basic problems which we inherited as a nation in 1948 still continue to plague us. When we read or hear about India, it is usually as an indication of major world problems such as hunger and over-population. Political independence does not have much significance for the very poor and the dispossessed.

China, on the other hand, seems to have achieved political, cultural and economic independence, so that it is once again counted as one of the powers to be reckoned with, and its credibility has increased, particularly after the first nuclear explosion of 1964. Even those who disagree with its political system or ideology recognize its tremendous accomplishments since 1949, definitely a much faster and more remarkable growth than India has accomplished since 1947. China has been able to motivate and marshal its internal resources while India has failed significantly in this. India is still dependent economically on its benefactors even to feed all its own people. It hardly makes India or its accomplishments credible except when someone wants to laud the "largest democracy in the world".

China also seems to have made tremendous strides in reorganizing its society. From what we have heard and read about the warlords and their constant exploitation of the Chinese peasants, and from the ways and for the length of time the Chinese peasants suffered, present-day China seems to have totally reorganized its society without the tremendous cost in human life or the blood-shedding we read about in the French Revolution or the Stalinist period in Russia.

This offers a definite challenge to India



where reorganization of society is not yet accomplished in spite of our acceptance of socialism. The basic caste structure of the Indian society remains mostly intact in spite of the various dents in it through technological achievements and enlightened constitutional provisions. In fact, it may be asserted that the rich have become richer and the poor poorer in the last two decades, while in China an equitable redistribution of resources seems to have resulted. India accomplished some reforms while China accomplished a revolution. It does raise the question as to how long India can manage without a thorough reorganization of its society and how such reorganization is going to come.

Another point refers to the often misunderstood Chinese cultural revolution. Our knowledge of this is extremely fragmentary, but from what I gather, it is a laudable attempt to create a new consciousness in the Chinese people, a new pride, and also to create a new Chinese man and society. While these may sound very ambitious, they seem to be extremely valid goals.

SIAGIAN: "Mass mobilization" and "forced savings" are features of the "Chinese model" that I think many Asian governments would like to apply in order to achieve rapid growth of their gross national product. But non-communist Asian governments with distinct political and cultural values cannot and will not practice the high degree of personal and mass regimentation required by the Chinese communist experience. Whatever "social democracy" means in a non-Chinese and non-communist Asian setting, many of these governments still value and like to maintain basic human rights in their political systems even if it means a slower economic growth.

What do you admire and what do you criticize about China's Revolution?

CARINO: China's revolution must be judged primarily in terms of its impact upon the Chinese, and not on anyone else. One must admire it for what it has done to China, especially in light of what China was before the revolution. Corruption has been largely eliminated from the bureaucracy. Compared with the other developing nations, and despite some setbacks in plans, the rate of economic growth is high. Within a very short period of time, China has attained a technical military capacity that has made her a major political power in the world. And, most importantly, the Chinese revolution, in having made China strong again, has regained the lost dignity of the Chinese which came as a result of the Western impact.

The criticisms one can level at the Chinese revolution are the usual criticisms of revolution: the excesses that go with the massive effort at rebuilding and reconstruction of the whole social order. It is a question whether such excesses are peculiar to the Chinese revolution or whether they are part of any major effort at social revolution anywhere.

GEORGE: It is obvious that I admire the tremendous achievements of China in emerging from a defeated, divided country into a modern, independent, and powerful nation, as well as its efforts towards creating a new man and society.


What I find most difficult about China is its apparent isolationist policies which make it hard for any interaction between the Chinese and others. I can understand some of the reasons why China feels surrounded and threatened from all corners, but it seems to me that to the

degree that it has achieved internal cohesion and progress it can afford to open itself up to creating friendship and co-existence.

I have very little knowledge about individual freedom within China. Though I abhor the self-satisfying descriptions given by the popular press in the West and some parts of Asia, of China as a totalitarian system, I will have to raise questions as to how much price in individual freedom is being paid by the Chinese for the progress they have made.

I also find distasteful the bombastic and sometimes exhibitionistic type of propaganda: the mass marches of a million Chinese in red dresses with red books, the chanting of thousands of young people in chorus from the red book, the swimming in the Yangtse by Chinese soldiers to show their allegiance to Mao, etc. There is something in me that revolts at any type of regimentation and controlled hysteria, and inasmuch as there are evidences of this in China, I find them distasteful. I feel this all the more because I think that the achievements of the Chinese revolution are numerous and remarkable enough so that they can stand on their own as witness to the world of what a nation with will and resolve can do.

SIAGIAN: I think this question is not that relevant. The Chinese communist revolution has a distinct autonomous character and origins which one ought to respect as a non-involved observer, at the same time realizing that political and/or military concepts of that revolution cannot be imported at will. There are enough examples by now, including recent Indonesian political history, that convincingly prove the tragic disasters caused by attempting to copy certain elements of the Chinese revolutionary



communist doctrine, miscalculating the dynamics of their own political culture.

Is there presently a "spillover" of Chinese theory and political thought and culture to the rest of Asia?

CARINO: Very definitely. China is much too close and historically too involved in Asia to be completely isolated from politics of the rest of Asia. The Chinese revolution, moreover, is much too monumental an event to be contained within China forever. There is a considerable amount of Chinese studies going on in Japan, where very significant investigations on the Cultural Revolution are going on, and in other parts of Asia, for example, the Philippines, intellectuals have shifted from Marx to the works of Mao Tse-tung. One can say that such interest is present elsewhere.

GEORGE: I do think there is a genuine "spillover" of Chinese political thought and culture in the rest of Asia. I must hasten to state, however, that this is not seen primarily among the ruling classes or the elected representatives who run our countries. These leaders have been trained in a different ethos and most of them have learned the lessons from their former (colonial) masters as to how to keep the "natives" reasonably content. For them, Chinese thought must be anathema.

But even among them I think there is a "thaw," mainly because of the abject failures of some of their own experiments at democracy and nation-building.

But among the young, the disinherited, and the intellectuals, there seems to be some genuine effort to understand the China behind the rhetoric of both the Chinese and their antagonists. In India, for example, the existence of the "Moscow wing" and the

"Peking wing" factions of the Indian Communist Party indicates something more than a like or dislike.

SIAGIAN: A great country like China with such a rich cultural history is bound to have "spilling effects" on its neighboring countries. Specialists of Asian culture, for instance, like to talk about the Indic- and Sino-cultural influence zones in Southeast Asia. Discussing this question, whether there is presently a spillover of Chinese theory and political thought—and I place the word "presently" in a broader time-span—one should realize that the communist revolutionary experience is not the only significant event in contemporary Chinese political history. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's nationalist movement which spearheaded the 1911 Chinese revolution had some influence on the political thinking of the Indonesian nationalist movement during the Dutch colonial period.

Again I like to stress at this point not to exaggerate the impact of such spilling effects; all those Asian countries outside China (or India for that matter) throughout their history have shown a remarkable capacity for absorbing and molding outside influences—and I am thinking especially of Indonesia—and in the final analysis they come up with something truly indigenous.

How do national prejudices against indigenous Chinese populations affect Asians' views of China?

CARINO: The history of Chinese relations with the rest of Asia is a long one. It has had its dose of Chinese cultural superiority, and in the twentieth century, Chinese economic power in many Asian countries. The question of "overseas Chinese" is a major one in some Asian countries. These have created suspicions



and mutual manipulation. Chinese are not naturally loved by other Asians.

However, this long contact has also meant the assimilation of much that is Chinese in many Asian cultures, so that appropriate means of discourse with Chinese have been formed among many Asians. The myth of the "yellow peril" and the "we have lost China" mentality are not present in Asia largely because of this long intimate contact with Chinese.

What is important to me is for Asians to begin to look at the Chinese revolution not only as part of their long historical interaction with China, but as a new phenomenon, a political event that cannot be fully explained by that history, and must be judged in the terms in which it arose. This is still to happen—but it must happen if the rest of Asia is to understand China. Whether we like it or not, China is part of Asia's future, and no peace or progress in Asia can be achieved without a constructive and meaningful relationship with the People's Republic of China.

GEORGE: Indigenous Chinese are not a major factor in India.

SIAGIAN: Dr. Ruth McVey, Cornell University's specialist on Indonesian affairs, once stated that "China has been not one thing to the Indonesians but three: a state, a revolution and an ethnic minority." Talking about the Chinese minority problem in Indonesia, we should not be too rash by labelling it as racial per se. Of course, we cannot ignore the historical origins of this problem. Dutch mining enterprises and plantations directly imported Chinese laborers from the 1860's to the 1930's and the Chinese minority gradually occupied the intermediate entrepreneurial position between Dutch big business and the indigenous people. Obviously, when



political independence was achieved, in those regions where indigenous entrepreneurs could not withstand the combination of Western capital and Chinese ingenuity, the Chinese minority became the target of rising economic nationalism. But the picture is much more complex than that and varies from region to region.

As a member of a church in Djakarta with many members of Chinese descent, I would like to cite the 1966 message from the Indonesian Council of Churches on "The Problem of the Chinese":

"1. What is most urgently needed is the achievement of a sufficiently clear distinction between those who are alien Chinese and Indonesian citizens of Chinese ancestry, among other ways, by instituting Government regulations which make this distinction easier.

"2. Towards persons who are alien Chinese living in Indonesia, the Government should exercise a policy based on humanitarian considerations, on our national interest, and on international conventions, and which will be aimed at the immediate cessation of their economic domination over us. . .

"3. Within the process of Nation-building going on at present, the Government and the entire Indonesian people, including citizens of Chinese ancestry should, without distinguishing ethnic group or ancestry, work together responsibly towards the common future of the whole Indonesian Nation, if necessary leaving behind and forgetting past affairs."

Is China a serious threat to Asia?

CARINO: China as a problem to Asia is only a threat—at best a potential

one—at the moment. In many ways, the claim that China is a dangerous threat has been an American creation, more real and feared in American minds than in most Asian minds. The evidences for such a claim have been the supposed aggressive claims of China based upon an ideology of world domination—Communism, recent utterances of Chinese leaders, and the so-called "border incidents." Except for the last, these "evidences" are all mostly verbal, but not actual. The border incidents are in themselves not a sign of peculiar aggressiveness. Border problems have been and still are common problems of the new states of Asia as a result of colonial rule (Philippines-Malaysia, Malaysia-Indonesia, and certainly India-China).

GEORGE: It took me a long time to get out of the 1962 syndrome of some hostility towards, and suspicion of, China as a result of the China-India conflict. The possibility for such conflicts is real and the need to avoid them is more urgent now than ever.

But I do not agree with the assumption that China offers a serious threat to Asia, at least not as yet. It does offer a challenge, but not a threat.

Though we have a history of colonialism by Western nations of which we are quite conscious, we have no similar history of Chinese colonialism, or even threat to subjugate the continent of Asia, although at different times China could have at least partially accomplished this.

Secondly, there is no doubt that China now is stronger than ever and presumably could take on any Asian nation. But in spite of the large number of people it can mobilize for a possible land conflict, it is quite deficient in the technological achievements that can help sustain a prolonged conflict outside its

immediate borders. Also, China knows that to involve itself in major conflicts with its neighbors will certainly bring the major powers into the scene and it will thus have to face unpleasant consequences.

Thirdly, it is known that in some parts of Asia the native Chinese citizens face serious threat (as in Malaysia), and in some cases lives and properties have been destroyed. Would not one think that if China had the interest and capability to protect the Chinese population overseas by getting involved in the internal affairs of the countries where there is such unrest, it would do it? But thus far we have no indication of any such intention on China's part.

Finally, not even the enemies of China have been able to prove that even a single Chinese soldier is placed outside China. China has regained its control over Tibet and many antagonists of China call this "occupation." But if we look at Chinese history in its relationship to Tibet, we will learn that China has only exercised its right to consolidate its territory.

SIAGIAN: China is not a threat in the classical military sense of armies marching to the south. I do think it is a threat in terms of its ideology and political subversion. But the best defense is a healthy social and economic system.

However urgent the question of a "Chinese threat" seems to be, the decisive test case faced by Asian countries still is and will be for many years: to maintain some harmony in domestic politics which would enable them to reshape their agricultural economy so sensitive to the fluctuations of the world market in order to meet in an effective way the growing social and political demands of their exploding populations.

THE SNOW

Written by Mao Tse-tung in 1945, this, perhaps his best known poem, was popular with both the Nationalists and the Communists during the Civil War.

All the scenery in the north
Is enclosed in a thousand li of ice,
And ten thousand li of whirling snow.
Behold both sides of the Great Wall—
There is only a vast confusion left.
On the upper and lower reaches of the Yellow River
You can no longer see the flowing water.
The mountains are dancing silver serpents,
The hills on the plains are shining elephants.
I desire to compare our height with the skies.
In clear weather
The earth is so charming.
Like a red-faced girl clothed in white.
Such is the charm of those rivers and mountains,
Calling innumerable heresies to vie with each other in pursuing her.
The emperors Shih Huang and Wu Ti were barely cultured
The emperors Tai Tsung and Tai Tsu were lacking in feeling,
Genghis Khan knew only how to bend his bow at the eagles.
These all belong to the past—only today are there men of feeling!

(From THE WHITE PONY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF CHINESE POETRY, edited by Robert Payne. New York: The New American Library (Mentor Books), 1960, p. 319. Reprinted here by permission of the editor.)

THE MOVING FINGER WRITES

SERIOUS CHURCH DAMAGE FROM HURRICANE CAMILLE

Damage to churches and church-owned installations by Hurricane Camille was estimated at \$15 million in an interim survey reported at Gulfport, Mississippi. The figure was expected to rise when a final tabulation was possible.

Roman Catholic, Episcopal, United Methodist and Baptist facilities were hardest hit by the worst North American hurricane in recorded history.

The district parsonage of The United Methodist Church in Gulfport was demolished. Methodist churches in Venice and Buras, La., were wiped out. Except for the administration building the Gulfside Assembly, Waveland, is no more. Community centers in Biloxi and Columbia, Miss., also were damaged.

Roofs were blown off the Mississippi Rural Center at Columbia, First Church, Gulfport, and Leggett Church at Seashore Assembly in Biloxi, where there was damage also to Arlene Hall but none to Seashore Manor retirement home. Pass Christian Church was moved 20 feet off its foundation.

There was water damage at First Church, Pascagoula, and East End and Epworth Churches, Biloxi, Slidell, La., and Coden, Ala., near Mobile. Wind unroofed First Church, Gulfport, and toppled a tree onto the parsonage.

The Buras church had suffered loss of its wooden building in "Betsy" in 1965 and had rebuilt, with National Division aid, a brick structure which was lost this time. Damage to other churches in this hard-hit Plaquemines Parish along the mouth of the Mississippi was not yet known.

Bishop Pendergrass reported being able to look right through the Gulfport District parsonage, where all furnishings and all personal belongings of the Rev. Dr. Seth Granberry were swept away.

A "Bishop's Emergency Appeal" for United Methodists was held on Sunday, September 7, to aid churches and families hurt by the hurricane.

Damage to Catholic properties was estimated at \$12 million. About one half of Mississippi's Catholic population is on the Gulf Coast. Only thirty-one of 107 Catholic buildings in the storm's path escaped. The Louisiana area raked by Camille also had heavy church damage.

Father Gilbert O'Neill, O.S.B., was drowned. He was chaplain to the Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart at Ocean Springs, Miss. Incomplete reports listed six Catholic churches, three schools, four rectories, two convents and four parish halls completely destroyed.

Dr. W. Douglas Hudgins, executive secretary of the Mississippi Baptist Convention, said uninsured Baptist losses would probably be \$1.5 million. Two Baptist assembly areas were hit by Camille's wind and waves. Kitiwake Baptist Assembly near Pass Christian was left with no walls standing. At Gulfshore Baptist Assembly, a \$2 million



RNS Photo

Hurricane Camille swept through the historic Church of the Redeemer in Biloxi and left only the bell tower standing. A religious education building behind the church was badly damaged but did not collapse. A huge oak tree uprooted by the storm obscures the view of the rubble which is all that remains of the sanctuary.

retreat center near Bay St. Louis, Miss., four of thirteen buildings survived.

Episcopal Bishop John M. Allin and Canon Fred Bush reported after an inspection tour that approximately \$1 million in damages were sustained by churches and schools of their denomination.

Trinity Church, Pass Christian, Miss., built in 1851, was leveled as was the church's rectory. The wife of the rector, the Rev. Durrie B. Hardin, was killed. The clergyman was found in a state of shock under the rubble.

Two of the most architecturally unusual churches on the Gulf escaped with hardly a scratch. They are St. Michael's Catholic church, Biloxi, designed like a sea shell, and the St. Peter's by the Sea church with an all-glass front. Both are right on the beach.

In Biloxi, the Episcopal Church of the Redeemer, erected in 1875, lost its entire sanctuary. A bell tower was left standing.

As relief supplies poured in from all parts of the nation, a Southern Baptist pastor co-ordinating relief work in Biloxi said, "If you look in every one of these boxes, you'll see the love of some mother who is sending something to people in need. It really restores your faith in people." (RNS)

MORE FUNDS DEMANDED FOR BLACK COLLEGES

More funds for black colleges and universities, literature which reflects the concerns of black people, more black staff administrators, and scholarships for minority students were included in a list of demands made Friday, August 29, by a group repre-

senting Black Methodist for Church Renewal (BMCR) in Nashville, Tenn.

A small group of adults, mostly from Atlanta, demonstrated at the United Methodist Boards of Education and Evangelism and asked that all staff and office personnel be sent home as a gesture of sympathy for their demands.

The leaders of both boards refused the request although some board workers returned home after seeing the BMCR signs.

Leader and spokesman for the demonstrators was the Rev. Cain Felder, BMCR executive director from Atlanta. More than 30 children and youth from a local NAACP chapter participated in the demonstration.

Felder held an early morning press conference in the Upper Room Museum at

which time he made several demands prepared by a BMCR task force on higher education:

—\$20 million from the Board of Education and \$25 million from the Board of Evangelism during the next five years for 13 black colleges and universities related to The United Methodist Church.

—Church school and general church literature which reflects the perspectives and concerns of black people.

—Greater percentage of black administrators in significant positions of responsibility on the boards.

—Scholarships and loans for minority students based solely on need.

At a meeting in the Upper Room Chapel with the Board of Evangelism staff, the Rev.

Joseph H. Yeakel, general secretary of the board, expressed appreciation for the confrontation but said the board had not been historically related to the colleges as a program board and that raising \$25 million would be impossible. "This board has a deficit at the present time of \$130,000," he said.

Dr. Yeakel added that the board and staff had already agreed to make whatever adjustments necessary to place more black personnel at all levels. "I have already indicated my willingness earlier to resign, if necessary, to place a black man as general secretary of the board."

He also explained that the use of funds from *Upper Room* profits is determined by the United Methodist *Book of Discipline*.

"What you're really saying," Felder retorted, "is, 'sorry, nigger, go home.'"

At a later meeting with the staff of the Board of Education most of the discussion centered around the support of 11 black college and universities, one seminary, and one medical school related to The United Methodist Church.

Felder said The United Methodist Church is "continuing its long history of calculated institutionalized racism" by maintaining separate methods for supporting its black and white schools. He cited Rust College in Holly Springs, Miss., as one black school established in the late 1800's which is not yet accredited while Alaska Methodist University, established in the late 1950's is fully accredited.

He also expressed fear that the black schools would be closed or "absorbed."

The Rev. Dr. Myron F. Wicke, general secretary of the Division of Higher Education, agreed that a new "rationalization" must be found for supporting the predominantly Negro schools. "Through the years we on this board have worked hard to keep these colleges open and we've been shot at by the white liberal who sees them as segregation and by the black intellectual who sees them as academically inferior. Now, thank God, the time has come when we can enlist your help and the help of your people to help us work toward keeping and improving these schools."

A few days earlier the division of higher education had announced that several boards and agencies of the church were making an emergency \$2 million appeal for Race Relations Sunday this February to assist the black schools. "We know that the future of these colleges must depend on more than collections such as Race Relations Sunday," Dr. Wicke said, "But right now we've got to keep food on the table until we find a better approach."

A study, financed by a \$68,500 Ford Foundation grant, is being conducted under the direction of Dr. Daniel C. Thompson, New Orleans, La., a sociologist at Dillard University.

"In trying to determine what we should do we realized that it was about time that Negroes themselves do a study of Negro higher education in predominantly Negro colleges," Dr. Wicke said.

At several points the exchange became heated. "I want it to go on the record here

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RNS Photo

This church is torn in half by the destructive winds that accompanied Hurricane Camille and caused "enormous damage" to churches and religious education facilities. As the number of deaths reached near 200, Camille was considered one of the most destructive storms ever to hit the North American continent. The National Catholic Disaster Relief Committee, Church World Service, relief arm of the National Council of Churches, the Salvation Army, and other religious relief units rushed materials and funds to the stricken area.

and now," Dr. Wicke declared, "that two months ago I invited you (Felder) personally to come visit us, go through our records, and question us about anything. You didn't come."

Dr. Wicke, along with the two other general secretaries, also asked Felder to assist them in finding qualified black people who could be employed by the board.

The three general secretaries refused a request made by Felder for a special meeting of the Board of Education executive committee September 30 to consider the BMCR task force demands.

Felder expressed appreciation for the meeting with the staff but said he was disappointed that the secretaries would not ask the board's president, Bishop O. Eugene Slater, to call the special September 30 meeting. "We know there are limits but unless we start seeing evidence of your concern we will plan a national mobilization against The United Methodist Church," Felder warned.

D.C. COURT OVERTURNS LAW ON SIDEWALK DEMONSTRATIONS

Setting aside the conviction of a United Methodist executive arrested during last year's Poor People's Campaign, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that police may not break up sidewalk protest demonstrations unless there is a threat of disruption or violence.

Holding that blocking a sidewalk is not a crime in itself, the court reasoned that such a regulation would also allow punishment of such innocents as sightseers or school children. "Of course," the court said, "we do not think for one minute that such a group would be prosecuted . . . But the mere possibility of such a prosecution makes it incumbent on the government to allege that the act was done under circumstances which threaten a breach of the peace."

Because the government failed to claim a possible breach of peace, the court set aside the conviction of the Rev. John P. Adams, director of the department of law, justice,

and community relations for the United Methodist Board of Christian Social Concerns. Mr. Adams was one of 200 arrested June 24, 1968, along with the Rev. Ralph Abernathy in the Poor People's Campaign march on the Capitol. Mr. Abernathy had spent 20 days in jail as a result of his arrest; Mr. Adams had received a \$25 suspended fine.

RABBI RECALLS CHURCHMEN WHO OPPOSED THE NAZIS

The case of Auxiliary Bishop Matthias Defregger of Munich, who was involved in the execution of seventeen Italian hostages in World War II, recalls at the "opposite perspective" some of the "extraordinary individuals" in the Roman Catholic hierarchy who took risks to oppose the Nazis, Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum observed on New York radio station WINS. Rabbi Tanenbaum did not "presume to intrude" in "internal Catholic matters" by criticizing the bishop. Rather, he praised others who "prefer to die

rather than to sin by conforming to evil."

"Here and there in the dark Nazi night," he said, "it must be remembered, there were extraordinary individuals who did take a stand against the demands of automatic and unquestioning obedience to the Nazi rulers.

"Cardinal Faulhaber and Cardinal von Galen risked severe reprisals by courageously preaching sermons, crying out, 'it is better to die than to sin' by conforming to evil. There were even a few such as the Austrian peasant, Franz Jagenstater, who were willing to give up life itself rather than sacrifice their conscience in the face of a call to murder innocent people."

Today, he noted, "some of the opposition to the war in Vietnam, to the spiralling nuclear arms race, to preparation for chemical and biological warfare are but expressions of a growing refusal to remain silent when silence is often taken to mean assent."

(RNS)

CONCERN VOICED OVER DIRECTION OF MISSION

A struggle within the churches and the World Council of Churches on what is Christian mission must be worked out in "mutual trust," the WCC's director of evangelism said in Canterbury, England.

The Rev. Philip Potter, head of the Division of World Mission and Evangelism, took part in a discussion following the report of his division to the WCC's policy-making Central Committee.

Many speakers expressed concern over the

nature and direction of Christian mission. The committee was asked in the report to approve new programs in theological education, Christian literature production, ecumenical sharing of mission personnel and urban and industrial mission.

Dr. D. T. Niles, a Ceylonese Methodist and a World Council president, said the need to proclaim the Gospel of Christ is recognized by all Christians but there is much disagreement in the WCC as to who Jesus Christ is, where he is found and how he is identified.

In response, Mr. Potter said the disagreement existed in all Churches, not just in the council. "We are not hiding the fact of disagreement," he stated. "But we believe the issue must be fought out in mutual trust within the fellowship of the World Council. And we are determined not to lose our nerve."

Father John Meyendorff, a Russian Orthodox theologian from Crestwood, N.Y., urged that in the face of a "violent dialectical struggle" over mission the council make some choices among the alternatives sketched out last year at the WCC's Fourth Assembly.

Dr. Jan Lochman, a Czech theologian who teaches at the University of Basel, Switzerland, advised an evangelistic approach, a willingness to listen to secularists and people of other faiths. He called it "Socratic evangelism."

"In Czechoslovakia our willingness to

enter into dialogue with secularists bore fruit," he said, referring to relations between Christians and Marxists. The Czech churchman said the "world church has lost the authority it had in the past" and should not act as if it had all the answers.

An appeal for close interrelation of WCC emphasis on mission and world development, a priority set last year, was issued by Dr. F. A. E. Nababan, secretary of the Council of Churches in Indonesia and vice chairman of the WCC division on mission. "There is no development without mission," he told the committee.

Giving the division's report was Dr. Tracey Jones, its chairman and also head of the United Methodist Board of Missions.

In summarizing the work of the WCC unit he listed areas in which theological study, including dialogue with men of other faiths, is taking place.

(RNS)

INDIA BISHOP BACKS CHURCH UNION PLAN

On the eve of the decisive voting by United Methodists in India as to whether they will go into church union (the first of 11 annual conferences will vote September 17-21, the last December 3-7), one of United Methodism's four bishops has come out strongly for union.

Writing on "Why I am for Church Union" in the August 14 issue of the *Indian Witness* (official Methodist paper for India), Bishop Eric A. Mitchell of the Hyderabad Area says his basic reason is reconciliation. He urges the Southern Asia Central Conference (India) of The United Methodist Church to join with five other churches in the proposed Church of North India by approving the Plan of Union (Fourth Edition). If two-thirds of the votes cast in the 11 annual conferences are in favor of the Plan, India's approximately 600,000 United Methodists will join in forming the new united church in 1970.

Conceding that "the Plan we have before us is by no means a perfect plan, for no one can make a perfect plan; perfection is only of God," Bishop Mitchell maintains: "But as members of God's family, praying together, loving each other, working under God's guidance, receiving His grace, serving our Saviour and Lord, being guided by His Holy Spirit, let us move into God's larger family, the body of Jesus Christ, the perfect union."

Declaring that "when we move into Church Union, we cooperate with God in His act of reconciliation," Bishop Mitchell says: "I think we will agree there is no perfect (denomination) church. There is the fact of our division, our separateness. There is the need for reconciliation. Our church, the Methodist Church, great as it is, wonderful as it is, or for that matter any other church that claims to be the finest church, is not big enough itself for the whole world and its people. Only a universal family, the universal Church, a universal fellowship can be the adequate bearer of a universal gospel. . . . In God's family there is no exclusiveness. If there is, we have failed to understand the atoning act on Calvary."



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VANDALS HIT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN NEW YORK'S HELL'S KITCHEN

The vicar of an experimental Episcopal congregation here claimed his church is being vandalized because of its stand on social issues.

The church is St. Clement's Episcopal, which is host to the American Place Theatre and a regular place of experiments in worship. The vicar is the Rev. Eugene A. Monick, Jr., 40.

"They say we are 'nigger lovers,'" he told newsmen. "There have been six break-ins in three months. Last week they stole a new refrigerator, and on Friday night (Aug. 22) someone threw a firebomb through the window. It's lucky we weren't burned down."

Mr. Monick said the "old grass roots families" in the Hell's Kitchen area where the church is located "don't like us," but he also asserted that he does love the neighborhood.

He said vandals had painted on the church front such signs as "All niggers should be killed, 46th Street against niggers," and "White power-Nazi power."

"I don't know how we can come to terms with the community," the cleric said. "We're not so much a community-oriented church. We are trying to make religion relevant to the world today."

St. Clement's was the subject of a WORLD OUTLOOK article in March, 1967, called "Revolution in a City Parish."

BUILDING PROGRAM IS REPLACED BY MISSION

Members of St. Luke Presbyterian church in Wayzata, Minnesota have abandoned plans to build a new sanctuary costing \$300,-

000. Instead, they will spend half of the amount for remodeling and expanding existing facilities and use the rest to assist residents of poverty areas in Minneapolis.

Members credit their minister, the Rev. Robert K. Hudnut, with changing the congregation's plans.

"We were going to build the biggest and best sanctuary in the suburbs," said David Prosser, an elder. "We hired a well-known architect to design it.

"And over the next several years, we collected about \$165,000 in pledges and planned to borrow the rest of the money."

But there was some division within the church leadership over whether this was the best use for the money. "A number of us were concerned about our obligations as Christians," said David Stricker, another elder. "Many of us knew from past experience the needs and problems of those living in the inner city.

"We have been involved in programs at the Minneapolis Workhouse, The City (a teen center in south Minneapolis) and at The Way (community center serving the north Minneapolis black community).

In February this year there was a tragic accident which had a big impact on St. Luke congregation. Mrs. Kay Cheney, the young director of Christian education for the church, was killed in a car crash.

"It may seem kind of trite but a lot of us felt that someone was trying to tell us something—about the value of one human life," Mr. Prosser said.

"After her death, some of the extreme feelings about how we should spend our money seemed to mellow and we drew closer together." Then in March, the Session

decided to throw away the architect's plans for the new \$300,000 sanctuary and to limit the spending for remodeling and expansion of existing facilities to \$150,000.

In addition, they launched the Kay Cheney Benevolence Fund drive to raise \$150,000 "to support a number of programs aimed at helping people in need to help themselves." By the end of July, Mr. Stricker, who headed the drive, and his volunteers had obtained pledges of \$170,000 to be collected over the next three years.

This year the church plans to spend \$50,000 of that money in five areas.

A check for \$4,000 has already been given to administrators of the Upward Bound program to pay the tuition and living expenses of six Indian students who have enrolled at the University of Minnesota.

In addition, the congregation has promised \$10,000 to the directors of The City, the teen center that is attempting to help youths who dropped out of school and have become drinkers or drug users.

Other programs proposed for funding this year include:

—Challenge Foundation. (This is an existing corporation that gives loans to minority group individuals who want to start their own businesses.)

—Narcotics in the Community. (A program aimed at identifying and trying to solve the drug problem among high school students in Minnetonka.)

—Block Partnerships. (A project to bring St. Luke members together with Negroes in the city "to see what can be done to solve problems of a local nature on the Near Northside.")

WORLD ORDER SUNDAY: "THIS CROWDED WORLD"

The problem of a rapidly increasing world population will be highlighted by The United Methodist Church in its observance of World Order Sunday this year. This is believed to be the first time that a denomination has given such major nationwide emphasis to the population issue.

The observance, October 19, will have the theme "This Crowded World." It is related to United Nations Day on October 24, since population growth is of world-wide concern, according to Herman Will, Jr., executive for the World Peace Division of the Board of Christian Social Concerns, sponsor of the event.

The agency is urging churches "to affirm that we are ready, with God's guidance, to make the necessary decisions as a matter of Christian responsibility."

The General Conferences have supported family planning since 1956. The 1968 conference advocated counseling for married couples and support for public policies to aid family planning, both in the United States and in other countries.

HIGHEST MILITARY COURT UPHOLDS NOYD CONVICTION

The conviction of Air Force Captain Dale E. Noyd for refusing to train pilots for duty in Vietnam was upheld by the Court of Military Appeals, the highest military tribunal.



Hundreds of defiant Czechs gather in Wenceslas Square despite the presence of troops and armor. Protesting a year of Soviet occupation on the anniversary of the Soviet invasion, thousands of Czechs chanted "Russians go home!" until they were cleared from the Square by tear gas and night-stick attacks. Czechoslovak troops and tanks were used to control the demonstration.

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On the basis of selective conscientious objection to the Vietnam war, Capt. Noyd refused in 1967 to serve as an instructor on F-100 aircrafts. He was court-martialed and served all but two days of a year of hard labor while under house arrest at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M.

The Noyd case attracted considerable religious attention since the career airman's dissent to the Vietnam war involved objection to particular wars, a position endorsed in recent months by many Protestants, Catholic and Jewish groups.

Although the U.S. Supreme Court refused to intervene in the procedures of the military courts, Capt. Noyd was released from confinement by order of Justice William O. Douglas.

In upholding the conviction, the military appeals panel agreed that the training pilot was sincere in his objection by rejecting his argument that he be released because of conscientious objection. The military court held that no exception to fulfillment of orders was provided by Congress on the basis of

conscience.

Capt. Noyd said in Clovis that he expected to be dishonorably discharged from the Air Force. Provisions of the earlier sentence, now upheld, included forfeiture of all pay and allowances.

Out from under the military with the Court of Military Appeals decision, he said he expected to appeal the sentence in civil court. "I am profoundly relieved that I can finally shed this uniform and get into the real courts," said Capt. Noyd.

He announced that he had accepted a position on the faculty of Earlham College, a Quaker institution in Richmond, Ind.

(RNS)

DISCIPLES VOTE SUPPORT FOR CHURCH COUNCILS

The General Assembly of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) voted its support for world, national, state and local councils of churches at its meeting in Seattle, Washington.

The resolution approved by the top national body of the nearly 1-million-member denomination observed, in part, that resentment of some local congregations over the church's involvement in social issues has "sometimes" caused curtailment of the work of the church councils.

The resolution of support for the church councils ran into difficulty, however, as a Missouri pastor challenged the statement on the basis that the National Council of Churches had "agreed to discuss" the Black Manifesto presented by James Forman.

But the pastor's motion for recommitment of the resolution failed as the denomination's president denied that the resolution was intended as "blanket endorsement" of the NCC and as others argued that the Church's ecumenical position would be weakened by defeat of the resolution.

The resolution encouraged the general (national) and regional units of the denomination "to interpret the work and promote the support of the World, National, State and Local Councils of Churches."

Individual congregations were asked to make "some contribution" to the work of the National and World Councils, and congregations already supporting the councils were encouraged to increase their support by 50 per cent or more over the next two years.

The preamble to the resolution praised the NCC and WCC as "both a source of encouragement to the participating denominations and a prophetic goad to renewal and deepened commitment."

"There is merit," the resolution continued, "in giving support to Christian enterprises which courageously witness in the midst of ambiguous situations in spite of some controversy and difference of opinion." It also noted that support for church councils "has not grown as rapidly as the opportunities for ecumenical mission, witness and service."

The challenge to the resolution came from Dr. Lawrence W. Bash, minister of the 3,000-member Country Club Christian church in Kansas City, Mo. "It is highly doubtful," he argued, "that this assembly should give blanket approval to the actions of church councils since the National Coun-

cil of Churches agreed to discuss Mr. Forman's statement (the Black Manifesto)."

"I think the leadership of the National Council of Churches needs to hear from denominational leaders about support for a program which is definitely Marxist," he continued. "I am not sure that the National Council is being responsive at this point."

Dr. A. Dale Fiers, general minister and president of the Christian Church, quickly denied that the resolution was a "blanket endorsement" or that the NCC had endorsed Forman or the manifesto. (RNS)

NATIONAL COUNCIL POLL REVEALS A MIXED IMAGE

Although more than half of the American adults who know of the National Council of Churches disapprove of church involvement in social and political issues, 54.9 per cent approve of the NCC, a National Opinion Research Center poll indicates, while only 22.0 per cent have an unfavorable opinion of it.

This apparent contradiction and other interesting facts were brought to light by the NORC poll taken last year and by a secondary analysis of the poll's data to be published August 29 by the NCC's Department of Research as a single document called "The Image of The National Council of Churches."

Three questions were asked a representative sample of the adult population of the U.S. 1) Have you ever heard or read anything about the NCC? 2) If "yes" in general, do you have a favorable or unfavorable impression of what it is trying to do? and 3) In general, do you approve or disapprove of the churches becoming involved in social and political issues such as the urban crisis, Vietnam and civil rights?

Based on the survey, it can be assumed that 60.3 per cent of the U.S. adult population has heard of the NCC. Among those who have knowledge of it, 54.9 per cent favor what it's trying to do, 22.0 per cent do not favor its aims, and 22.8 per cent do not know, the poll showed.

The answers to the third question—whether or not one approves church involvement in social and political issues—brought 58.5 per cent down on the disapproving side and 36.7 in favor of such action.

Broken down into what kinds of people felt which way, the pollsters' data reveals that persons with annual income of \$6,000 or over were more likely to have heard of the council, while those with incomes in excess of \$10,000 were more likely to have a favorable opinion of what it is trying to do.

The level of education of the respondent was directly related to knowledge of the council, with high school graduation being the major cutting point. Attitudes toward both the council and the churches' social involvement were also related to education levels: college graduation was the turning point here between unfavorable to favorable opinions.

Although sex made little difference in knowledge of the council, women were more likely than men to have a favorable impression of its work and to approve of social issue orientation.

More whites than non-whites have heard of the council but proportionately more non-whites approve of its involvement in social issues. Those in middle-years, 35-54, were more likely to know of it than younger or older people. The older people were more likely to disapprove and the younger, approve of the social ministry of churches.

Politically, more Republicans and Independents knew and approved of the council than Democrats, but Democrats were more likely to favor social action.

Less Roman Catholics than Protestants had heard of it, quite naturally, but proportionately the R.C.s were more likely to approve. Among Protestants, more Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Lutherans and members of the United Church of Christ had heard of it than Methodists and Baptists. The Methodists joined the former in being more favorably impressed with its work than the Baptists and the Disciples of Christ. Other Protestants were "most unfavorable," the poll found. With few exceptions, those denominational persons in favor also approved of involvement in social issues.

The more frequently respondents attended church, the more likely they were to have heard of the NCC. Yet the most regular attenders were more unfavorable toward the council and uncertain about the prophetic role of the church.

The analysis of the poll done by NCC researchers interprets its results by using five different categories through which it comes up with 44 hypotheses about who supports the NCC and church involvement in social issues.

Interesting among the conclusions that it suggests is one which points to an "elite" group of supporters, called this because its combination of social-economic power and interest in social action separate it from other church-type persons.

Two kinds of conflict groups were also identified as supporters: young adults who have some power and are generating conflict attain more and Negroes who are seeking to share fully in the reward system of society.

The analysis also found that while the NCC is most visible and approved by home owners with high income and high educational levels, people in sales, managerial and clerical positions have a less favorable impression than those in various professions.

DISCIPLES CELEBRATE MERGER AT DENOMINATION'S BIRTHPLACE

Cane Ridge, Kentucky, was the scene in 1801 of one of the most far-reaching events in frontier religious history, and in August, 1969, it was again alive with enthusiasm for a landmark decision.

Around the Cane Ridge church of the Rev. Barton Stone in 1801 some 20,000 persons gathered for a camp-meeting revival out of which came the Disciples of Christ.

It was to the spot, and to the Meeting House, that the delegates of 80,000 black Disciples came to celebrate their decision to merge with the predominantly white General Assembly.

They arrived at the Cane Ridge shrine from nearby Lexington after ending the 53-

year history of the National Christian Missionary Convention, the black unit of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).

It was an appropriate site for the occasion. Not only was Cane Ridge the seat of Barton Stone. It was in the cabin-like church that the first black Disciples evangelist was converted and freed to preach among his people.

The slave's owner named him Alexander Campbell, after the man who stands along with Stone as the Disciples' founder. A missionary group was set up to represent interests in the General Assembly.

The Cane Ridge service began with the hymn, "The Church Is One Foundation." White persons present sat in the loft—as blacks once did.

The Rev. Claude Walker, black convention vice-president, said in a prayer referring to the 1801 revival: "Lead us to joining together even greater than that event. Even the tombstones call us to proclaim that even this church on earth belongs to God."

The early Cane Ridge camp-meetings emphasized denominationalism, and ecumenicity was a founding principle of the Disciples.

Mr. Walker made a passionate plea for church union in his sermon.

"When we come here and share in being present, we should remember we are called to give up anything which would separate us," he said. "We need to reaffirm our com-

mitment . . . to be dissolved into one body of Christ."

Mr. Walker said there never should have been separate racial units among Disciples. "We didn't this day ask some people to sit in the balcony to be mean," he added.

A plea for abolishment of denominational and racial lines was made by the preacher, who said the revival of 1801 needs to happen again, "not in the same way, but in the same spirit."

Then the people in the loft were asked to come down. Everyone went outside where the black and whites joined hands in a circle of friendship. (RNS)

SOUTHERN BAPTISTS, JEWS AGREE ON SOCIAL ACTION

Seventy Southern Baptist and Jewish scholars concluded a three-day meeting at Louisville, Kentucky, recently with a call for interreligious coordination to influence government on social issues.

The scholars asked the conference co-chairmen—Dr. Joseph R. Estes of the Southern Baptist Convention's Home Mission Board and Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum, director of the American Jewish Committee's Interreligious Affairs Department—to explore the possibilities of an ad hoc committee of key leaders in the Catholic, Jewish and Protestant communities for the purpose.

Another resolution called for a Joint Baptist-Jewish effort to defend the religious lib-

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erty of Baptists and Jews in the Soviet Union and other countries "where religious persecution still prevails."

A separate resolution declared that churches and synagogues have a "moral responsibility" to become involved in seeking solutions to today's social problems, and criticized the U.S. government's spending \$80 billion annually for military defense while not meeting adequately the problems raised by poverty.

Rabbi Tanenbaum charged that the white Christian and Jewish communities have been "gutless" in speaking out on national priorities, but urged that the religious community should not be sold short on its ability to make significant social changes.

URBAN COALITION COUNCIL ASSESSES WELFARE PROGRAM

The Urban Coalition Action Council praised President Nixon "for moving to correct the serious deficiencies" of the current welfare system, but listed several major ways it felt the welfare revision could be improved.

The Action Council is the legislative lobby for the Urban Coalition. Because the coalition—a national amalgam of civic, business, minority and religious leaders—is tax exempt, it cannot take political stands.

Among the ways of strengthening the new welfare system proposed by the President, the Action Council suggested:

—Raising the level of minimum income, giving relief to states and cities overburdened by welfare payments, and including single people and couples without children;

—Not forcing mothers of children over 6 years of age to register for work and training;

—Making sure that the food stamp program is curtailed only as cash payments approach the minimum necessary to lift a family out of poverty;

—Establishing programs to create jobs and working out explicit federal standards governing the referral of people to companies that might hire them and the wages that they would be paid;

—Guaranteeing that present welfare recipients do not end up with less money than they are now receiving.

The Presidential plan, said the Action Council, was "significant" in that it would help millions of working poor now ignored by the welfare system and would provide income for unemployed parents seeking work or training, "thus keeping families together."

The Council's statement also praised the Nixon plan for removing the "barrier to work . . . which is a gross defect of the present system" and for introducing a "positive incentive" for individuals to enter the job market.

The Nixon program, the statement continued, takes "the enormously important step of accepting Federal responsibility to place a floor under the income of those eligible for assistance." (RNS)

INJUNCTION SOUGHT TO BAR PENTAGON GRAPE PURCHASES

Cesar Chavez's striking United Farm Workers has filed federal suit for an injunction prohibiting the U.S. Defense Department from purchasing grapes in excess of its 1967 orders.

The union's lawyer, Marty Garbus of New York, accused the Department of being the "buyer of last resort of scab grapes" and "deliberately" attempting to break the strike and boycott of the Farm Workers.

The suit filed in the Federal District Court of Washington, D.C. alleges that the Defense Department has violated its own regulations to remain neutral in labor disputes and that its purchase of grapes for the present year will amount to 16 million pounds as compared with 6.9 million pounds last year.

The union has been conducting a nation-

wide boycott of table grapes in an effort to gain recognition as the bargaining agent of migrant farm workers.

The boycott effort, which has received the support of many church groups and clergymen, has brought about a 20 percent reduction in grape sales in the 36 largest cities of the country, according to union spokesmen, and a 40 percent reduction of such sales in New York City.

Melvin Laird, U.S. Secretary of Defense, was named the defendant in the suit which is seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting the department from making purchases in excess of their 1967 orders, the year the boycott was begun. (RNS)

GOD'S ACTION IN WORLD PREOCCUPIES THEOLOGIANS

Forceful arguments to the effect that God is not only living but powerfully active in contemporary history were advanced at an 11-day conference in Oxford, England of prominent theologians—mostly Methodist—from all parts of the world.

Altogether, more than 100 theologians took part in the August conference, the fourth meeting of the Oxford Institute of Methodist Theological Studies. The Institute was conceived in 1958, with the encouragement of the World Methodist Council, as an attempt to make a positive Methodist contribution to the universal Church and the ecumenical movement.

Meetings were held both in Lincoln College and the Wesley Memorial church on the theme, The Living God. On the last day a summing-up address was given by Dr. Rupert E. Davies, Principal of the Wesley College, Bristol, who will be Britain's Methodist Conference president in 1970. He declared:

"This meeting of the Institute is now finishing, but it cannot be said to have reached a clearly definable conclusion. Not very much has been said to confirm the opinion held by some that God is dead.

"On the contrary, there has run through the conference a conviction that God is powerfully active in contemporary history and not least in the revolutions and protests which are changing society in a direction not yet discernible.

"Nor has there been a disposition to deny that God was active supremely in Jesus Christ; or even that He is still active in the Church, for all the obstacles put in His way by our antiquated structures and privilege-ridden establishments."

Dr. Davies went on to say that near this point the consensus of the participating theologians tended to break up, and he posed a whole series of questions such as: Who is God and how shall we speak about Him? Is He so mysterious that we had best speak of Christ only? What is Truth? What is the Bible? And what is Theology?

The conference brought together leading Methodist theologians from several countries, including the Scandinavian Bishop Odd Hagen, President of the World Methodist Council, Dr. Theodore Runyon of Emory University, Atlanta, Ga., and Dr. Paul Hessert of Garrett Theological Semi-

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Roman Catholic observers attended for the first time, while a noted Anglican speaker was Bishop Ian Ramsey of Durham, one of the Church of England's leading theologians.

In his address, Dr. Hessert indicated two channels of theological discussion in respect to God—"process theology," which was an attempt to recreate natural theology, and "radical theology."

According to Dr. Hessert, Dr. Davies reported, process theology "recognized the need of establishing at the outset a God-category with which to work—and that if the category was wide enough to include a Christology in the first place, no Christology was necessary; while if it was not, no Christology was possible.

"Radical theology meant the rejection of natural theology and complete concentration on God as he is revealed in Jesus Christ. This meant the virtual elimination of the category of the living God.

"The danger of such a theology was that it tended to divinize the values of the contemporary world and call them Christ. Nevertheless, such a theology needed careful attention. It was, in effect, a focusing of theology, not on God, but on the mediator to God, Jesus Christ, conceived not historically, but as engaged in specific action. In fact, on this view he is action.

"Such theology takes various forms. Christ may appear as a zealot, as the organizer of a revolution. Thus student protest or black power is given a theological status; the Negroes of America are the oppressed in every age, and the Christian is one who is with Christ for them, and Christ's action is the revolution."

Another American approach to this question was taken by Dr. Thomas Ogletree of Chicago who, according to Dr. Davies, argued that the right method of theology is not to get the Gospel clear and then apply it, but to discover the Gospel by engaging in Christian action.

METHODIST PREACHER SUSPENDED FOR ATTACKING CATHOLICISM


D. W. Taylor, a master plasterer and Methodist preacher in Shipley, England, has been suspended from his church appointment because he refused to stop attacking doctrines of other churches, especially Roman Catholic.

The suspension, rare in Methodism, was ordered by the Rev. C. E. G. Henman, a Methodist superintendent in Yorkshire. It was recommended by the local preachers' association. Mr. Taylor, who has been preaching for nine years, was also said to attack prominent religious leaders.

Mr. Taylor has a right to appeal to the national Methodist Conference.

The preacher said he would not reverse his position, claiming he did not advocate anything contrary to Methodist doctrine. Criticism of Catholicism, he stated, is sanctioned by the writings of John Wesley, founder of Methodism.

He expressed the fear that his Church was "drifting towards Rome." (RNS)



His Eminence Joseph Diangiendo, spiritual head of the 3-million-member Church of Christ on earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu of Congo (Kinshasa), is greeted, at top, by some of the Kimbanguist faithful at Nkamba-Jerusalem, the spiritual center of the Kimbangu Church. The World Council of Churches' Central Committee at its Canterbury, England meeting approved WCC membership for the African Church. At bottom is the mausoleum where the Prophet Simon Kimbangu, founder of the Church, is buried. Joseph Diangiendo is the youngest son of the Prophet Simon.

RADIO STATION VETOES CHURCH-SPONSORED SHOW

A program in a Protestant-sponsored radio series was rejected by WABC Radio in New York City for being "too political." Interviews with the head of the Catholic Peace Fellowship and a United Methodist Bishop were to have been featured.

Cancellation of the show was confirmed by the Rev. Reuben Gums, director of radio and television for the Council of Churches of the City of New York, producer of the weekly "The Sound of the City."

The action was taken by the local ABC affiliate primarily because of statements by Bishop James Armstrong, head of the United Methodist Dakotas Area, on the Vietnam situation, according to a WABC attorney.

Mr. Gums said the station retained the right to audition programs and decide on usage in accordance with ABC policy.

Bishop Armstrong was one of eight Amer-

icans who went on a fact-finding tour to South Vietnam in the early summer. Remarks critical of the present Saigon government and the American position in Vietnam had earlier been made at a press conference and presented in testimony to a U.S. Senate sub-committee.

His position was that the South Vietnamese government is not representative of the people of that land. He expressed surprise at the WABC cancellation and called it a "denial of freedom."

Tom Cornell, national secretary of the Catholic Peace Fellowship, was to have discussed draft card burning and his experience during a six-month jail sentence for destroying his card.

Mr. Gums said he felt the cancellation "came close to censorship" since the objection was basically to Bishop Armstrong's evaluation of the Vietnam political situation.

(RNS)

DEALING IN HOPE

By ELIZABETH WATSON



The Call to Prayer and Self-Denial goes out to all United Methodist women in October to join in prayer, study and sacrificial giving for the fulfilment of God's plan in a troubled world.

It continues the World Service Day and the Denominational Day of Prayer of the Women's Society of World Service of The Evangelical United Brethren Church and the Week of Prayer and Self-Denial of the Woman's Society of Christian Service of The Methodist Church.

For decades the Call has been an instrument by which women of the church have been dealing in hope. From the very first it has had a powerful appeal. The first offering, to undergird missions, was nearly seven thousand dollars. In the time of unification of three Methodist branches, 1941-42, the offering had risen to \$113,400. As of May, 1968, the offering was up to \$645,912.

Where does all this money go? It is carefully designated, far in advance of the October observance. Every jurisdiction is represented on the committee that selects the recipients, and the various areas of mission work are given their turns at receiving portions of this offering.

Whenever a Methodist center or project is placed upon the Call to Prayer rolls, it is a time of rejoicing for all concerned. Why? Because this fund is an over-and-above fund. This means that it is *in addition* to the regular channels of giving in the Board of Missions. In a way, it is *extra* money. It goes for purposes that could not be fulfilled in regular appropriations or budgets. During past years Call to Prayer projects have included wiring, repairs, wings and even buildings, furnishings, literature, evangelistic programs, scholarships, supplies, leadership training for women, and a great many other objectives. Sometimes the objectives are purposely left a bit vague, so as to allow leeway in the allocating of the funds.

This year the offering is to go for automobiles and trucks and mobile chapels in the home field or, in the language of the report, "equipment and vehicles for church and community workers in town and country;" and "property improvement in community centers."

In World Missions the offering designated for overseas missions will go for "rural life training ministries."

Perhaps these terms sound rather indefinite, but they are meant to include (according to the World Division report) very definite items. Some of these items are machines for drilling wells (and according to the United Methodist Committee for Overseas Relief, "a well means life to a village"), diesel pumps, pipes, and other equipment. Included also are scholarships to Methodist agricultural students. Some workers and some preachers of India are being sent to Japan for further training in rural development.

The Rural Development Center in Vikarabad has been growing the new hybrid grains for three years, getting up to three times the State average yield with old varieties.

There are rural life centers also in Pakistan, Malaysia, Congo, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Latin America.

"It is imperative," says the World Division of the Board "not only to feed the hungry, but also to end hunger itself."

* * * *

It is the belief of those who are assigned in the home field to church and community work that they should be concerned for the welfare of all the people in their communities, and that the church should be an integral part of the community.

Eighty-nine United Methodist church-and-community workers work in thirty-eight Conferences, criss-crossed in the United States from Canada to Mexico.

Obviously, rural work involves being able to get around the countryside. The average mileage for these eighty-nine persons is more than a thousand miles per month. And obviously the cars, bookmobiles, trucks, jeeps, and other vehicles are not going to run merely on faith. In addition to transporting persons from place to place, filmstrips, movie projectors, books, leaflets, blackboards, and other materials and supplies must be taken to churches and other meeting points.

So substantial and so satisfying is the Week of Prayer (now called the Call to Prayer) that United Methodist women have kept it going through all the changes in organization, including the 1968 union of The Methodist Church with the E. U. B. Church.


The last week of October is the time especially designated for the observance of the Call to Prayer and Self-denial, but Guilds and Societies are free to choose any time of the year to have this program and appeal.

The Call to Prayer offers women of United Methodism an opportunity to find new joys in giving, new joys in expressing thanks, and new joys in extending the mission of the Church.

Following is an appropriate prayer to use in private or group observances:

"O merciful and compassionate God, giver of manifold blessings, grant to us open hearts that we, deeply mindful of these things so needful, both at home and abroad, may act with keenest sympathy and humility, in love. In Christ's name we offer our prayers and gifts. Amen."

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
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
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