PREVENTING A SECOND MASSACRE AT WOUNDED KNEE, 1973:
UNITED METHODISTS MEDIATE FOR PEACE

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On February 27, 1973, about 200 Indians led by the American Indian Movement (AIM) launched an armed occupation of the historic battle site of Wounded Knee, South Dakota. In 1890 over 300 unarmed Sioux were massacred there by the Seventh Cavalry. AIM did this to draw public attention to the Indians' economic plight, the repercussions of broken treaties, and what they considered political oppressions from the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Oglala Tribal Council led by Dick Wilson. The Indians were armed largely with rifles, shotguns, revolvers and little ammunition. The U.S. government responded with a display of military might. This included army units from the 82nd Airborne, two F4 Phantom jets, several National Guard helicopters, 17 armored personnel carriers, machine guns, flares, about 150 FBI agents, over 200 U.S. marshals, at least 100 police from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, several Justice Department officials, CIA investigators, and Secret Service Agents. To many, this assemblage looked much like the Vietnam War had come home. The story of this tense and deadly 71-day standoff is well known. Absent from most histories, however, is the active role that mainstream churches played, and particularly the United Methodist Church through the auspices of the National Council of Churches (NCC), in preventing greater bloodshed on that site.

In 1973, the NCC and its denominations were facing a crisis of credibility as mainstream fortunes and memberships sharply declined while those of conservatives rose. They were also being criticized from both the left and the right as ineffective and irrelevant in their liberalism on social justice issues. In addition, their eight years of failed efforts to persuade the govern-

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2 “American Indian Movement Box #147 Rapid City, South Dakota,” 1445-3-3:13, GCAH; Smith and Warrior, 196, 211-213; Crow Dog and Erdoes, 192; Rolland Dewing, Wounded Knee II. (Freeman, S.D.: Pine Hill Press, 1995), 56, 92.
ment to change its Vietnam policies had alienated former White House allies. Yet, in spite of these frustrations, at Wounded Knee mainline church leaders gained enough trust from both the government and the occupying Indians to serve as an intermediary that brokered ceasefires, facilitated dialogues, and helped convince both parties that negotiations were the best way to reach mutually desired ends. They also ensured that people's basic needs of food, blankets and medical care were met for as long as they were allowed on the scene. In their minds, they were able to do at Wounded Knee what they had failed to do in eight years of thwarted efforts on Vietnam. Government officials and Indians recognized their credibility, they demonstrated the Church's relevance as an institution engaged in society for peace and justice, and they felt that their methods and motivations were validated by results.

When the occupation of Wounded Knee began, the Governing Board of the National Council of Churches was in session in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. News of the conflict came to the Board through one of its members, an Oglala Sioux woman, who, along with staff from the NCC's Division of Church and Society, pressed the Council to take action. The NCC adopted a resolution instructing its President to urge government officials to refrain from a violent military response; it also authorized the Council to send representatives to Wounded Knee to see first hand if and how the churches might play a constructive role there. It selected two Methodists, Bishop James Armstrong of the Dakotas Area and Reverend Wesley Hunter, Executive Secretary of South Dakota's Association of Christian Churches, to be the Council's ambassadors at Wounded Knee. Bishop Armstrong added two more Methodists to the team: Reverend Homer Noley, an American Indian who chaired the NCC's Indian Task Force as well as served on the Methodist Board of Global Ministries, and Reverend John Adams who worked as Director of the Law, Justice and Community Relations Department of the United Methodist Board of Church and Society. A fifth clergyman, Reverend Dr. Paul Boe (American Lutheran) from Minneapolis, came separately to Wounded Knee upon the invitation of AIM. Each man played important roles in the days ahead, but none more so than John Adams who served as the clergy team's key negotiator between the American Indian Movement and the U.S. government.

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4 "Wounded Knee, 1973: A Scenario;" "NCC Involvement at Wounded Knee;"


It is no surprise that Armstrong wanted Adams on the scene. Beginning in 1967, the Indiana pastor worked on behalf of the Methodist Church to help quell violence and foster justice in a number of volatile situations. These included fair housing demonstrations in Milwaukee, and riots in Detroit and Newark. In 1968 he helped organize the church’s response to riots in Washington D.C. following Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, and directed the NCC’s involvement with the Poor People’s Campaign. A year later, he was mediating the crisis sparked by black power leader James Forman’s occupation of the Interchurch Center in New York City. In 1970 he operated as the Methodist Church’s crisis facilitator after the slaying of four students at Kent State and two at Jackson State. The year before Wounded Knee, Adams was in Miami Beach heading a group called Religious and Community Leaders Concerned that helped keep peace between police and demonstrators during both presidential conventions held there. His work in the latter crisis put him in a close working relationship with the Justice Department’s Community Relations Service where he established trust-based contacts that would pay dividends at Wounded Knee. For his successful work in these mediation assignments Adams was fondly called “the soother of troubled waters,” and he became the Church’s only full-time, professional, crisis interventionist. The assignment at Wounded Knee would be one of his toughest. Not only were the political complexities of dealing with several divided factions among both the Indians and government agencies daunting, he would also find himself under gunfire, but not for the first time. As a B-24 bomber pilot in World War Two, Adams was shot down and held captive by the Nazis for nine months. That event propelled his commitment both to the ministry and to purposeful, fearless work on behalf of justice.

Armstrong arrived at Wounded Knee on March 2nd. At first the clergy team was uncertain what role it might play. It hoped only to be able to prevent the kind of strong-arm law-and-order response to protest that resulted in the bloodshed seen at Kent State and Attica Prison. From all appearances, the government was preparing to assault. As Adams discovered, “There were great pressures upon the government to promptly use the full fire power of the law enforcement agencies at Wounded Knee to ‘clean out’ the ‘criminals or the clowns.’” Likewise, AIM’s young warriors, many of whom

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3John Adams to Robert H. Ruby, March 13, 1974, 1445-3-1:26, GCAH.
4“Circuit Rider for Peace.”
whom were fresh from combat in Vietnam, announced that they were prepared to die fighting. Armstrong was careful from the beginning to position the team as an “active neutral,” not favoring either side but rather there to help facilitate productive communication and prevent bloodshed. Therefore he sought permission from the Justice Department official in charge, Ralph Erickson, to be on site and attempt to contact AIM. Since Erickson deemed that the clergy’s presence would not be problematic, permission was given.

Armstrong received access inside AIM’s perimeter that day to share with the protestors the clergy’s priorities on the scene. Adams and Hunter entered later that evening to do the same. Adams and Armstrong made clear to AIM that, while they disagreed with AIM’s use of violence, they recognized that the deeper justice issues raised by the Indians compelled serious recognition, study, and rectification. They stressed that the churches were interested in helping Indians move America toward addressing the repercussions of past wrongs, and facilitate Indian self-determination. In fact, since 1969, the NCC had made justice advocacy for American Indians part of its mission. The United Methodist Church expressed similar priorities.

During the first few days of the occupation, Adams, Hunter and Noley kept a low profile and worked simply to shuttle communication back and forth accurately between AIM and the government. They did this to build credibility as “active neutrals” with both sides. AIM was not quick to trust Adams who was clearly the day-to-day leader of the team’s work. At one point, rumors flew that Adams was collecting information for the F.B.I. Dennis Banks of AIM took it upon himself to grill Adams for an hour. Adams made clear to Banks that, just as the Indians were willing to die for their beliefs, so too was Adams ready to give his life for the cause of peace with justice. Upon concluding his interrogation, Banks led Adams into a museum building that was serving as AIM’s headquarters. He put Adams up on a table and announced to the large group of armed Indians, “This man represents the National Council of Churches. I don’t want you to shoot at

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12 Untitled draft of article given to John Adams for preview, n.d., 1483-4-3:61, GCAH.
14 “Bishop Discusses Role: NCC at Wounded Knee.”
17 Testimony of John P. Adams, U.S. District Court, District of South Dakota, Western Division, December 10, 1973, 1485-4-1:15, GCAH.
him or other identifiable N.C.C. representatives. They are neutral, and they are here to help establish negotiations and prevent bloodshed. Let them pass freely through the roadblocks and don’t hassle them.” Later Adams saw a sign posted which read, “Don’t shoot at NCC observers. They are neutral.”

AIM leaders were not shy about criticizing the churches for their complicitious past role in government efforts to steal Indian land and eradicate Indian culture. Why, then, was AIM willing to work with church leaders at Wounded Knee? According to Dennis Banks, the American Indian Movement saw evidence that the mainline churches were undergoing a conscious transformation in their understanding of Indian issues as well as church involvement in perpetuating past wrongs against Indian communities. From a practical perspective, Banks also admitted that AIM wanted a prominent institutional ally with moral clout in its fight against the government. The churches fit that bill. They had demonstrated previously that they were willing to help American Indians financially in their struggle to acquire basic human rights and necessities, and, at Wounded Knee, showed readiness to do so again. Bottom line, AIM recognized that they needed what the churches offered them at Wounded Knee. They may have also sensed that the mainline churches needed them too, for AIM’s trust and involvement helped validate and shape the churches’ social justice ministries. Adams would urge AIM to participate on NCC committees by implying that such participation would encourage more generous giving to AIM causes.

One must also ask why the U.S. government was willing to work with Methodist/NCC church leaders at Wounded Knee. The Nixon administration had dismissed mainline church leaders as impractical, out-of-touch, communist-appeasing, bleeding heart liberals on Vietnam and race issues. However, government reaction to the clergy delegation at Wounded Knee varied by person, agency, and even within agencies. The Justice Department was more positively disposed to the clergy presence than the F.B.I. or Department of the Interior, both of whom were invested in the survival of the Tribal Council under Dick Wilson. The Justice Department’s Community Relations Service already knew, trusted, and admired the work of John Adams. In fact, it was the CRS that drove Adams and Hunter to the occupation site the first night. After seeing Adams in action at Wounded Knee, the Attorney General’s Office would also recognize his usefulness. Like AIM, the government had practical reasons for allowing the clergy

20 John Adams to Dennis Banks, March 28, 1974, 1445-3-1:21, GCAH; Lucius Walker, Jr. to John Adams, April 2, 1974, 1445-3-1:21, GCAH.
22 Testimony of John P. Adams.
team to work on Wounded Knee. First, Nixon and his staff did not want to give the Indians a second Wounded Knee, and in earlier conflicts with militant Indians, Nixon's representatives had averted them successfully. After the disasters of Kent State, Attica, and the Vietnam War, government officials were beginning to recognize the limits of, as well as potential negative repercussions from, using overly aggressive, bloody, military assaults to put down disgruntled "revolutionaries." Second, polls of the American people revealed that they did not support a government assault, and the State Department warned that dead Indians might provoke international outcry. Yet, representatives from different government agencies on the scene remained divided over this subject as they received constant pressure from the Tribal Council and ranchers to end the occupation quickly by any means necessary.

On March 7, pressures upon the government to reestablish law and order peaked, and its patience seemed exhausted. Erickson gave AIM what appeared to them an ultimatum. The occupants had until 6:00 p.m. the following day to leave Pine Ridge voluntarily, implying that those remaining would be forced out and arrested. In response, the young men inside of Wounded Knee began to apply their war paint and ready their weapons. Adams felt that bloodshed was imminent unless some credible option was made present. Therefore, around 4:00 a.m. on the 8th, Adams drafted a fifteen-point ceasefire agreement that he hoped would be acceptable by both sides. With Noley's help, he revised it, got Armstrong's assent, and then called the NCC to secure its approval for the commitments that he had assigned to it. Once done, he contacted the Justice Department in Washington and had them tape a reading of the agreement to submit to the Attorney General. Initial reactions were encouraging. While awaiting the government's official reply, Adams and Armstrong together presented the ceasefire draft to AIM from which they received an immediate positive response. Shortly before the 6:00 p.m. deadline arrived, the Justice Department confirmed its support of the ceasefire. The clergy team felt that

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24Smith and Warrior, 236.
27Testimony of John P. Adams.
29Testimony of John P. Adams; "Pastoral Letter from Bishop Armstrong."
they had just stopped a potential bloodbath. According to Adams, arrested AIM leader Carter Camp told the U.S. Attorney that, "The National Council of Churches saved many lives—both yours and ours—by helping to arrange for negotiations in early March." Adams' ceasefire proposal demanded much of the NCC. First, it required that NCC personnel as well as clergy from the Pine Ridge area be placed in strategic spots between contending sides to serve as official observers of the ceasefire. Second, the NCC, along with other church-sponsored groups, would ensure provision and delivery of food and supplies to those inside Wounded Knee. Third, the NCC team would receive the submission of all weapons by belligerents as well as monitor all arrests, imprisonments and trials stemming from the Wounded Knee incident. It promised as well to provide legal representation to Indians who might be arrested for their actions at Wounded Knee. Finally, the NCC and its member denominations pledged to help raise funds for projects designed to address the human rights issues raised by AIM, as well as support AIM's request for a formal hearing of grievances in Washington. Clearly, the churches were interposing themselves in a heavy way as peacekeepers between the two armed sides.

The ceasefire, which went into effect on the evening of the 8th, was followed by two more days of negotiations to hammer out the details of how the crisis might be brought to a close. During this period, when things seemed to be on a path toward resolution, Hunter grew ill, collapsed, and was evacuated to Rapid City. Adams also left the scene briefly to meet with families who had lost loved ones at the Kent State shooting in 1970. While these two were gone, the ceasefire fell apart. A shootout erupted between the F.B.I and an AIM security vehicle. Both claim that the other side started shooting first. An NCC news item lays blame upon AIM which apparently hardened its position, retreated from the idea of surrendering weapons, and declared its intention to establish an "independent Oglala Sioux Nation." Erickson claimed that AIM used the ceasefire time "to fortify their positions with more weapons and ammunition."
Heavy firing erupted between the two sides, and the government refortified its position. Once again, Adams operated as a communications shuttle between volleys of bullets to stop the firefight. During one night of particularly heavy shooting, Adams drove his car between AIM and government security points several times with his lights off so as not to draw fire. He was able, through this shuttle diplomacy, to get the guns to silence once again. 36 Adams frequently worked twenty to twenty-two hours a day running this kind of communication shuttle and working out negotiation terms. He said, “I have found that if you simply work longer hours in pursuit of a goal than others do to keep you from reaching it, you can accomplish more than they can.” He also noted that “both sides came to trust our communication lines and our integrity.” 37

By the 13th, the government had replaced Erickson with Assistant Attorney General Harlington Wood. Wood decided to embrace the negotiations posture promoted by the churches and asked Adams to set up a meeting with AIM leaders immediately. AIM agreed to meet with him, but only on their turf inside Wounded Knee. The FBI and U.S. Marshals condemned the idea fearing that Wood might become AIM’s hostage. Adams said that he trusted AIM’s word that Wood would not be harmed or held. Wood was willing to take the risk. So Adams escorted him inside Wounded Knee where AIM ushered the men to a meeting place with decorum and respect. As Adams described the scene, “A security force surrounded us to protect Wood. Young men stood at intervals, many of them holding their rifles at port arms in deference to Wood, and two young men on horses led the procession. It was an elaborate show of protocol, as I have ever seen....” When queried by a worried FBI agent upon their return about AIM’s treatment of him, Wood replied, “They guarded me better than you do.” 38 While the negotiation issues were complex and required many more meetings, the clergy team felt that both sides were now showing a clear commitment to resolve the crisis through negotiations not guns, and Adams was convinced that the churches’ active involvement made that happen.

Apparently so too was Tribal Council Chairman Dick Wilson who worked successfully to have Adams and the rest of the NCC team banned via tribal court order from the reservation before talks could be completed. Wilson and AIM hated each other. AIM saw Wilson as a corrupt puppet of the BIA who, with government help, created goon squads to harass and murder those opposed to his leadership. It demanded Wilson’s removal. Wilson saw AIM as a band of criminals not worthy of negotiation.

When the four Methodists began to make headway with negotiations, Wilson worked to have them removed from his territory. He was also enraged when the clergy team convinced government officials to abandon an early attempt to starve out the occupiers, and to see them not as criminals, but rather as American citizens with grievances deserving of a respectful hearing, food and medical care. The government allowed the clergy to organize church-funded shipments of food and medicine for distribution inside Wounded Knee. At one point, during the heightened tensions following the failure of the March 8th ceasefire, a blizzard hit, stalling talks. The four Methodists on the scene helped maintain a state of calm, in part by ensuring that the Indians' basic needs were met during the storm. John Adams even transported a load of medicine on horseback over drifts of snow. Later, the government reinstated a ban on food deliveries, and Wilson charged the NCC with violating it.

How dare these liberal religious interlopers from the east interfere on his reservation without seeking his permission, complained Wilson. The fact that Armstrong's team had sidestepped Wilson fueled his resentment of them. Armstrong and Adams both stated publicly that they thought that Wilson recognized the government's authority, and that he was working with it on his own behalf. Therefore, they assumed that they only needed permission from the government and AIM to operate there. They had also heard Wilson state many times that he felt there was nothing to negotiate with AIM; therefore they deemed it useless to deal with him. Adams later admitted that he should have done more to involve Wilson or at least make some initial show of respect for his position. However, he was somewhat naïve about the intricacies of reservation politics before the occupation occurred.

When Wilson began his efforts to ban the NCC, Adams set up a face-to-face meeting with Wilson to hear his complaints. Little productive came of it. Wilson worked to have the Tribal Court first reduce the size of the NCC team on site (which, by then, had expanded to around thirty-five helpers), and later remove it altogether. Harlington Wood was under intense pressure from Wilson, the BIA, and others to support Wilson's authority as well as that of the Tribal Court. On March 17th, the Justice Department told Adams that, "to pacify the Tribal Council" he must send everyone home but himself—that both the Justice Department and Wood wanted him to continue his

39 Weidman, "Church Role Said Vital at Wounded Knee;" Dewing, 88.
40 "Methodist Clergy in the Thick of Things," The United Methodist Reporter, March 23, 1973, 1485-4-1:14, GCAH.
"Weidman, "Church Role Said Vital at Wounded Knee."
43 Testimony of John P. Adams.
work in facilitating negotiations, and that they could protect him in that role.\(^4^5\) In fact, Adams testified that Wood had expressed a need for Adams, telling him, "I'm going to keep you here if I have to have you deputized as a United States Marshal as a chaplain...because we need to have communication."\(^4^6\) However, a week later, on March 23rd, the Tribal Court moved against Adams when Wood was absent and ordered him to leave. Wilson and certain government officials claimed Adams was pro-AIM, not neutral, and that he was hindering resolution of the standoff.\(^4^7\) Adams relocated just beyond the reservation's boundary to Nebraska where he remained involved by phone until the crisis ended on May 8th.\(^4^8\)

The Tribal Council and Court under Wilson were not the only two sources of harassment eager to sabotage negotiations. White ranchers who lived in areas surrounding the reservation, and who benefited from Wilson's willingness to lease them reservation land for a pittance, had created an armed vigilante group that was ready to attack AIM if the government failed to end the conflict by May 4th.\(^4^9\) The government had a difficult time holding this force at bay and convincing them to stay uninvolved. Vigilantes were firing on both sides to provoke firefight.\(^5^0\) Recognizing this, the NCC sent its own strong appeal urging government to resist such provocation and maintain its commitment to resolution via negotiations. The NCC also offered to resume its role as intermediary.\(^5^1\) Many white residents of the area were critical of the NCC's involvement, including a number of South Dakota clergymen who, along with their congregations, sided with the Tribal Council against the "militants."\(^5^2\) Reflective of the ranchers' interests, a Nebraska lawyer named William B. Quigley brought a $3.2 million law suit against the NCC and John Adams for damages that AIM inflicted upon the BIA building in Washington the previous November. Neither the NCC nor Adams were involved with that demonstration, so the case was dismissed. However, it was an effective tactic to harass the NCC and attempt to dis-


\(^4^4\)Testimony of John P. Adams.

\(^4^5\)Dewing, 88, 121, 192.

\(^4^6\)Adams continued to meet with people involved in the negotiations at his hotel room and in Washington, D.C. "NCC Involvement at Wounded Knee;" Dewing, 88-89.

\(^4^7\)"Statement on the Wounded Knee Situation by the National Council of Churches," May 3, 1973; John Adams' handwritten notes, n.d. 1445-3-1:25, GCAH. See also "Untitled draft of article given to John Adams for preview."

\(^4^8\)Smith and Warrior, 253-256.


\(^5^0\)"UM Minister Names AIM Leaders at Trial," Missouri United Methodist, July 26, 1974, 1485-4-1:15, GCAH; Dewing, 89.
credit it in the minds of laity by connecting it to destructive, militant, violent acts against government property.\textsuperscript{53}

Once removed, the Methodist clergy team working for the NCC remained an indirect influence upon the slow process of securing negotiations to bring the crisis to a close. The nature and degree of the clergy's overall impact at Wounded Knee is debatable, but their impression of their own influence is clear. As they labored from afar, they felt confident that they had helped save lives and set the tone for negotiations that ultimately prevailed on May 8th. AIM leaders reinforced this notion in an address made to the United Methodist Board of Global Ministries' annual meeting after the crisis concluded. They said that, "Of the daring acts committed at Wounded Knee, one stands out above all others, for it called for the possible sacrifice of two human lives, two lives of two people who could have chosen not to go, who knew that death was very close at Wounded Knee. But they did come and placed themselves in a most dangerous mission. Between the lines of fire. Those men were Homer Nowley [sic] and John Adams. ...had it not been for the direct involvement of Homer Nowley [sic] and John Adams, that started the negotiations to end the crisis, there may very well have been a repeat of the 1890 Wounded Knee Massacre."\textsuperscript{54} They also told the Methodist leadership that the clergy team's work helped restore some of their lost respect for America's churches. "For many years now the American Indian Movement has been extremely critical of the churches and their role with Indian people, critical because we felt that churches played a major part in the dispossession of lands from Indian tribes.... / During the past years the American Indian Movement has wondered about the social principles of organized churches. What exactly is their total goal? What is the church? At Wounded Knee the questions were answered. Our only criticism may now be that there are not enough men like Homer Nowley [sic] and John Adams."\textsuperscript{55}

The years that followed Wounded Knee were despairing ones for AIM and the Oglalas. The Justice Department embroiled AIM's leaders in fighting a series of criminal charges stemming from the occupation, and the Oglala nation sunk into a deadly civil war between Wilson's and the traditionalists' factions. Throughout these events, the churches remained critical sources of financial, material and legal support for AIM. As explained in the \textit{United Methodist Reporter}, Christian leaders who helped AIM had concluded that it was the calling of Christians to become "frog kissers," i.e. to

\textsuperscript{53}Summons in a Civil Action, File #CIV 73-5030, United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, Western Division, March 15, 1973, 1485-4-1:14, GCAH; "NCC Involvement at Wounded Knee"; "Wounded Knee, 1973: A Journal."

\textsuperscript{54}"American Indian Movement Box #147;" Winston Taylor and Connie Meyer, \textit{United Methodist Communications/News Service} (New Orleans), October 26, 1973, 1445-3-2:40, GCAH.

\textsuperscript{55}"American Indian Movement Box #147."
follow Jesus’ example of showing concern toward “the unlovely people” of his day, such as “the Samaritan, the harlot,...and even the thief beside him on the cross.” Since marching with Martin Luther King, Jr. and opposing the Vietnam War, many church people had learned in a deepened way that the “frogs” of American society were calling the comfortable white churches back to a more authentic understanding of their role as institutions loyal to God before nation, and with a mission to put love for humanity and peace before politics and privilege. They recognized historically that the churches had failed to do this with respect to American Indians, becoming complicit with the culture and government in their destruction. In the early 1970s, through the auspices of the National Council of Churches, mainline denominations like the United Methodists sought to restore their Christian credibility with American Indians by valuing their lives, needs, rights, and experiences. They offered to use their resources within the institutional power structure to help defend Indians’ rights to humane treatment and justice when the government was failing to do so. They also sought renewed credibility with the Justice Department and Attorney General’s office by helping them avoid another bloodbath in the name of “law and order.”

Amidst the swirl of declining budgets, staff, and membership that mainline churches and the NCC faced in the 1970s, their sense that they had accomplished something important with respect to Wounded Knee was immensely meaningful. To their minds, they had helped save lives, give renewed hope, and protect courtroom justice. As John Adams wrote, “We can have hope only if we give hope to those whom we have so often left in despair in the past. If they have no hope, we can have no hope. When they do have hope, however, we must not exploit it by delay. We must confirm it by action.” Homer Noley also stressed the importance of the church’s actions at Wounded Knee. “The involvement of the churches is significant in that the church is showing courage and the ability to act in the presence of powerful human events. Let us hope that our action may be as profound as our silence has been in the past.”

56“Posting Bail for AIM Leader: the Church Dared to ‘Kiss a Frog,’” The United Methodist Reporter, August 22, 1975, 1445-3-3:13, GCAH.
57“Circuit Rider for Peace.”
58United Methodist News of North and South Dakota, March 15, 1973, 1445-3-2:40, GCAH.